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Abstract 
The objective of our paper is to conceptually and empirically challenge the idea of general 
information security policy (ISP) compliance. Conceptually, we argue that general ISP compliance 
is an ill-defined concept that has minimal theoretical usefulness because the policy-directed security 
actions vary considerably from threat to threat in terms of time, difficulty, diligence, knowledge, and 
effort. Yet, our senior IS scholars’ basket of journals has a strong preference to publish models in 
which the authors speculate that their findings are generalizable across all (or many) threats and 
controls contained in an organization’s ISP document. In our paper, we argue that compliance with 
each of the mandatory threat-specific security actions may require different (as opposed to similar) 
explanatory models, which makes constructing a universal model of ISP compliance problematic. 
Therefore, we argue that future ISP compliance literature will be more valuable if it focuses on the 
mechanisms, treatments, and behavioral antecedents associated with the required actions around 
specific threats instead of attempting to build a model that purportedly covers all (or many) threat-
specific security actions (or intentions thereof). To support this claim empirically, we conducted two 
studies comparing general compliance intentions (i.e., undefined security action) and threat-specific 
compliance intentions. In both studies, our data show that compliance intentions vary significantly 
across general compliance measures and multiple threat-specific security measures or scenarios. Our 
results indicate that it is problematic to generalize about the behavioral antecedents from general 
compliance intentions to threat-specific security compliance intentions, from one threat-specific 
security action to other threat-specific security actions, and from one threat-specific security action 
to general compliance intentions. 
Keywords: Universalism, Particularism, Theory of Planned Behavior, Protection Motivation 
Theory, Deterrence Theory, Rational Choice Theory, Behavioral Information Security, Compliance 
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1 Introduction 
Employees are required to follow a variety of policies 
contained in their organization’s information security 
policy (ISP) document (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010; Crossler, Long, Loraas, & Trinkle, 
2014; Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2018). Typical ISP 
documents are organized around the preventative and 
mitigating actions associated with specific threats 
(Siponen & Vance, 2014). For example, one section 
of the ISP might detail an employee’s required 
security actions pertaining to the ransomware threat 
whereas another section might outline an employee’s 
requirements pertaining to the phishing threat. Each 
section of the ISP outlines threat-specific security 
actions with differing levels of time, difficulty, 
diligence, knowledge, and effort in order to comply 
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with the specific policies (Posey, Roberts, Lowry, 
Bennett, & Courtney, 2013; Workman, Bommer, & 
Straub, 2008). 1  That is, all policies and policy 
violations are not the same because there are many 
different types of ISP-mandated actions, mitigating 
controls, and infractions (Siponen & Baskerville, 
2018). 2 
However, much of the ISP compliance research that 
has been published in our senior IS scholars’ basket of 
journals3 tends to focus on constructing models that 
attempt to explain generalized security behaviors 
across many or all ISP-directed actions (or intentions 
thereof). These papers make these claims by 
speculating about the generalizability of the threat- 
specific security action or actions that they 
investigated, by aggregating values across multiple 
threat-specific measures or scenarios, or by using 
generic (i.e., undefined security action) measures 4 
(Crossler & Belanger, 2014; Posey, Roberts, & 
Lowry, 2015). Yet, while compliance with the policies 
for certain threats and their mitigating controls may be 
relatively effortless, compliance with other policies 
may be quite deliberate and mindful (Goel, Williams, 
& Dincelli, 2017). If employees use different thought 
processes to comply with the ISP-mandated policies 
related to different threats, then we assert that 
compliance intentions with each threat-specific 
security action should logically have different 
mechanisms, treatments, and behavioral antecedents. 
Therefore, we argue that this behavioral variability 
across different policy-mandated actions makes 
constructing a widely generalizable model of ISP 
compliance that encompasses the policy requirements 
related to all (or most) threat-specific security actions 
problematic. 
 
1  An organization’s ISP document may cover more 
stakeholders than just employees. For instance, a library’s 
ISP may cover patrons connecting to its digital resources and 
a university’s ISP may cover visitors as well as students 
connecting to its network. For simplicity, we use the term 
employee to refer to any individual who is covered by an 
organization’s ISP. 
2 Not all ISPs are organized around specific threats. Certain 
ISPs are organized around mitigating controls or 
countermeasures, which may cover multiple threat-specific 
security actions in a single policy. Regardless, each policy 
requires specific security actions whether those actions cover 
a single threat or multiple threats. 
3  These journals are the following: MIS Quarterly, 
Information Systems Research, European Journal of 
Information Systems, Information Systems Journal, Journal 
of the Association of Information Systems, Journal of 
Management Information Systems, Journal of Information 
Technology, and Journal of Strategic Information Systems. 
4 These generic measures refer to the ISP document as a 
whole (i.e., compliance with all, most, or many of the 
policies contained in the ISP document without referring to 
a specific policy, threat, mitigating control, or 
countermeasure). 
The purpose of our paper is twofold: (1) to review the 
existing ISP compliance literature in the senior IS 
scholars’ basket of journals (i.e., the publications that 
are shaping the direction of the field) to determine the 
implicit or explicit scope of generalization along with 
the type of evidence used to make those generalization 
claims; 5  and (2) to investigate empirically whether 
those generalization claims are valid. Our literature 
review reveals that having the perception of wide 
generalizability of empirical results appears to be a 
hurdle that authors must clear in order to publish an 
ISP compliance paper in one of our top journals. We 
suggest that this publication hurdle is not consistent 
with the variety of threat-specific security actions that 
employees are required to perform (per the ISP) on a 
daily basis. Therefore, we propose that developing a 
particular “model of phishing ISP compliance” or 
“model of tailgating ISP compliance” is more 
theoretically useful than speculating about whether 
the results from one threat-specific security action are 
universally generalizable to other threat-specific 
security actions, because different sections of the ISP 
require different types of security behaviors.6 
We then conducted two empirical studies in different 
organizations where we compared general compliance 
intentions (i.e., “I intend to comply with the ISP”, 
which does not refer to any threat-specific security 
action) and threat-specific security compliance 
intentions (i.e., “I intend to comply with the <<insert 
threat-specific security action here>> policies” or a 
scenario vignette covering a threat-specific security 
action). The threat-specific security actions that we 
investigated were phishing, tailgating, flash media, 
workstation locking, and password sharing. 7  We 
evaluated these different ISP-directed security actions 
5  The term generalization is a contentious term in the 
information systems literature. In our paper, we use the term 
to refer to the applicability of research findings to other 
threat-specific security actions as mandated by the ISP. This 
use most closely aligns with Tsang and Williams’ (2012) 
idea of theoretical generalization and Lee and Baskerville’s 
(2003) idea of generalizing from description to theory. 
Although Williams and Tsang (2015) argue that these two 
views of generalization are incompatible, the semantics of 
that debate are not germane to our discussion of universal 
versus particular models of ISP compliance. 
6 For our analyses, we refer to universal models as models 
that are expected to affect all (or most) security behaviors 
contained in the ISP, whereas particular models refer to a 
threat-specific security action as dictated by the ISP. 
7  Phishing uses authentic-looking electronic messages to 
trick users into revealing personal or confidential 
information. Tailgating is the act of gaining access to a 
restricted area by piggybacking someone who has legitimate 
access. Flash media involves plugging thumb drives or 
external hard drives into USB ports. Workstation locking 
involves locking a computer such that a user must enter a 
password in order to use the machine. Password sharing 
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across four theories: (1) theory of planned behavior 
(TPB), (2) protection motivation theory (PMT), (3) 
rational choice theory (RCT), and (4) deterrence 
theory (DT). In both empirical studies, we found some 
similarities but many significant differences in the 
behavioral antecedents (and model fit statistics) using 
each of these theoretical perspectives. For instance, 
we found that attitudes, perceived threat severity, 
perceived costs of compliance, perceived benefits of 
compliance, and perceived costs of noncompliance 
vary from threat to threat and according to general 
compliance intentions. Therefore, researchers should 
be cautious about making the following claims of 
generalization: (1) generalizing models measuring 
general compliance intentions to all threat-specific 
security compliance intentions; (2) generalizing 
threat- specific models to other threat-specific security 
actions; and (3) generalizing threat-specific models to 
general compliance intentions. As such, we claim that 
it may not be empirically possible or conceptually 
desirable to construct a model of general ISP 
compliance that covers the variety of threat-specific 
security actions covered by typical ISPs. 
Our primary contribution to the literature is to 
challenge conceptually and empirically the idea of 
general ISP compliance. Our literature review reveals 
that prior top-tier ISP compliance research has spent 
significant time discussing the measurement of 
general ISP compliance across all or most of the ISP 
document, but much less time defining what a general 
model of ISP compliance is conceptually capturing. 
What does it mean when an employee generally plans 
to follow all (or most) of the policies and procedures 
contained in the ISP document? Conceptually, the 
extant literature has not clearly answered this 
question. However, prior literature on this topic has 
determined precise measurement (i.e., aggregating 
different threat-specific security vignettes or using 
generic measures related to an undefined security 
action) for this ill-defined concept. Before 
determining how to specifically measure general ISP 
compliance, we argue that it is first necessary to have 
a sound conceptual definition, which is lacking in 
many of the seminal ISP compliance papers. 
Furthermore, we question if it is necessary to have the 
same set of behavioral antecedents for all (or most) 
threat-specific security actions contained in an ISP? 
We argue that the answer to this question is no, 
because not all security-related actions covered by the 
ISP are the same. Forcing a universal model on all 
ISP-related behaviors masks the important threat-to-
threat differences that are prevalent across the broad 
spectrum of ISP-related security actions. 
 
involves sharing a personal password with a co-worker, 
contractor, or other individual. 
2 Particular versus Universal 
Many information systems (IS) scholars argue that the 
primary objective of social science research is to reveal 
broad generalities of social life (Cheng, Dimoka, & 
Pavlou, 2016; Tsang, 2014). That is, high- quality 
social science theories or models have universal 
applicability (universalism), whereas low- quality 
social science theories or models are applicable to a 
narrow context (particularism). However, it is certainly 
questionable if good science, as it relates to IS (or any 
other scientific discipline), has to be linked with 
perceptions of the level of generalization (Lee, 1991; 
Siponen & Tsohou, 2018; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 
2004). This idea has been debated since the founding 
of the IS discipline (Davison & Martinsons, 2016; 
Keen, 1980; Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Tsang & 
Williams, 2012). On the one hand, IS scholars want to 
uncover relationships that seemingly impact a wide 
range of technological and IS phenomena, which can 
be broadly applied to other IS and technological 
problems that individuals and organizations encounter 
(Cheng et al., 2016; Tsang & Williams, 2012). These 
purportedly universal constructs and relationships 
provide useful starting points for future research 
related to a wide range of IS problems. On the other 
hand, however, the adoption and use of IS is typically 
a unique endeavor. The industry, organizational or 
national culture, and the characteristics of the 
technology all affect the potential success or failure of 
an IS endeavor (Fernandez, 2016; Levina & 
Orlikowski, 2009; Sarker, 2016; Su, 2015). 
IS is not unique in struggling with this generalizability 
conundrum (Grover & Lyytinen, 2015; Hanisch, 
Hulin, & Roznowski, 1998; Johns, 2006). Little (1998, 
pp. 96-98) argues that any social science discipline that 
involves human agency struggles with generalization 
because human behaviors are formed based on norms 
and values that are interpreted differently from culture-
to-culture, society-to-society, organization-to-
organization, and individual-to-individual. As such, 
models explaining the variance in human behaviors 
involve significant boundary conditions, contextual 
factors, social forces, and situational constraints that 
limit empirical and theoretical generalization (Bunge, 
1998, p. 227; Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Walsham, 
1995). Despite this widely recognized issue, however, 
social scientists (including ISP compliance 
researchers) tend to be quite cavalier about specifying 
where their models or theories will hold (Szostak, 
2003, p. 33). This practice may have become the norm 
because these boundary conditions are perceived as 
research limitations or weaknesses in many social 
science disciplines, which can significantly limit the 
ability to publish research papers in these fields 
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(Suddaby, Hardy, & Huy, 2011). Yet, these boundary 
conditions may foster stronger model development and 
strengthen research validity; thus, the perception that 
boundary conditions are study limitations or 
weaknesses is questionable (Busse, Kach, & Wagner, 
2017). 
As ISP compliance researchers, we model general 
compliance behaviors, or ISP-directed threat-specific 
security behaviors (Moody et al., 2018).8  Then, we 
speculate whether our models have a universal or a 
particular level of generalization. For example, a 
universal model of ISP compliance would be the 
universal application of PMT across all individuals 
associated with any threat-specific security action. In 
this type of universal model, the path coefficients 
(magnitude, sign, and significance) as predicted by 
PMT are theorized to be the same across all (or most) 
ISP-related behaviors. For example, Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010, p. 550) specifically state that “study 
findings should be generalizable to the impact of fear 
appeals in all decentralized environments in which end 
users exercise some degree of autonomous control 
over IT resources.”9 While they have a small caveat 
associated with “decentralized environments,” they 
suggest a rather universal level of generalizability 
associated with their PMT model. 
In contrast, a particular model of ISP compliance is a 
model that is specific to a certain threat-specific 
security action as dictated by the ISP document. For 
instance, a particular model could investigate an 
instantiation of PMT to help explicate behavioral 
reliance and actual performance using a fake website 
detection tool (Zahedi, Abbasi, & Chen, 2015). The 
path coefficients may be similar to or different from 
the path coefficients for other threat-specific security 
actions, even though both may be using PMT. This 
type of model simply attempts to solve the problems 
associated with a single threat-specific security action 
(or intentions thereof). Potentially, the level of 
generalization in this type of particular model for other 
organizations with similar ISPs, trainings, sanctions, 
and security cultures may be related to a single threat- 
specific security action contained in the ISP. This type 
of particular model would not explicitly attempt to 
generalize to any other threat-specific security action 
or policy-mandated behavior contained in the ISP. 
 
8 In the ISP compliance research context, we do not build 
theories per se. We construct models using theories that were 
developed in other disciplines. For example, numerous ISP 
compliance researchers have used PMT or DT to model a 
variety of ISP-related behaviors but these theories were not 
developed by ISP compliance researchers. Therefore, we use 
the term model instead of theory in our paper. 
9 Interestingly, Johnston and Warkentin (2010) investigated 
a single security action (spyware) in their study. In their 
discussion section, however, they claim their spyware 
evidence should be somewhat universal across all other 
3 Basket Journal Literature 
Review 
We reviewed all of the literature in the senior IS 
scholars’ basket of journals related to ISP 
compliance. 10  Although this basket of journals 
narrows the scope of ISP compliance literature, we 
used this basket of journals because these publications 
determine the direction of the field. If our top journals 
have a tendency to publish purportedly universal as 
opposed to particular models of ISP compliance, then 
this signals to the rest of the research community that 
future ISP compliance research should investigate 
widely generalizable models if those researchers want 
to get their papers published in the best IS journals. 
Furthermore, if this senior IS scholars’ basket of 
journals has a preference for specific types of papers 
based on certain rigid beliefs concerning what 
constitutes good or exceptional scientific research in 
the ISP compliance space, then these issues need to be 
highlighted, debated, and discussed. 
We determined the papers for our literature review by 
independently searching for the keywords “security,” 
“policy,” “ISP,” and “compliance” from each 
journals’ inception date through April 2018. We 
performed this keyword search on the publication 
titles, abstracts, and author-submitted keywords. We 
then manually read each paper that was identified via 
the keyword search to determine if each paper 
investigated behavioral ISP compliance issues as 
opposed to technical or end-user information security 
issues. The final step in our review process was to 
backward and forward trace the citations for each 
journal that we previously identified in order to ensure 
that we did not miss a basket journal article (Webster 
& Watson, 2002). Following this process, we 
identified 25 relevant papers. We then classified each 
of the 25 papers based on the implicit or explicit scope 
of generalization and the type of evidence used to 
make those generalization claims. We did this in a 
data-driven manner, similar to the approach taken by 
Vaast et al. (2013), in which we let our analysis of the 
data determine the groupings.  
security actions (as evident by this quotation). We discuss 
type of evidence used to make claims of generalization in the 
next section of the paper. 
10 To be considered in our review, the research must focus on 
an ISP and compliance with the rules and regulations 
associated with that ISP. Well-cited end-user behavioral 
information security papers such as Anderson and Agarwal 
(2010), Boss et al. (2015), and Chen and Zahedi (2016) are 
not included in our review because the focus of those papers 
is on end-user information security behaviors and not ISP-
directed behaviors. 
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Table 1. IS Senior Scholars’ Literature 
 
Scope of generalizationa 
ISP-related behavioral information security research 






(many but not necessarily 
all ISP-directed actions) 
Particular 
(threat-specific security action 
such as phishing) 
Generic measures (i.e., “I intend to comply with 
the requirements of the ISP”)b 
9 0 0 
Threat-specific measures (i.e., “I intend to 
comply with the tailgating requirements in the 
ISP”)c 
4 0 2 
Scenario vignettes (i.e., present the research 
subjects with a hypothetical scenario related to a 
threat-specific security action)  
3 5 0 
Qualitative (i.e., case study of one or more 
particular workplaces or organizational settings) 
1 1 0 
a Two researchers determined the implicit or explicit scope of generalization from the framing of each paper in the introduction, hypothesis 
development, and discussion sections. 
b These measures generally refer to all required actions as directed by the ISP. These measures are not capturing a specific action or specific type 
of ISP violation. 
c These measures refer to a single threat-specific security action contained in the ISP.  
 
Using this process, we identified three categories 
related to generalization: (1) universal (generalizing to 
all ISP-related actions), (2) pseudo-universal 
(generalizing to more than one but not necessarily all 
ISP-related actions), and (3) particular (not attempting 
to generalize beyond the threat-specific security action 
that was investigated). We also identified four types of 
empirical evidence used to make the claims of 
generalization: (1) generic measures (i.e., undefined 
security action), (2) threat-specific measurement 
items, (3) threat-specific scenario vignettes, and (4) 
qualitative case studies. Table 1 summarizes the results 
of our literature review. Appendix A provides 
additional details concerning each paper in our 
literature review. 
From a generalizability perspective, this basket of 
journals strongly prefers to publish papers that attempt 
to construct broadly generalizable models of ISP 
compliance. In total, 92% (23/25) of the studies in our 
literature review explicitly or implicitly attempted to 
construct universal or pseudo-universal models of ISP 
compliance across all or many threat-specific security 
actions contained in the ISP. A pseudo-universal 
model generally assumes that if a research model is 
empirically demonstrated to affect more than one 
(usually two) ISP-related actions in a similar manner, 
then it has a higher likelihood of being generalizable to 
all (or most other) ISP-related actions. In this research 
context, if the paper cannot reasonably be assumed to 
affect multiple (probably most) threats and mitigating 
controls contained in the ISP, then it appears to have a 
low probability of being published in this basket of 
journals. On the one hand, this practice makes sense 
because this basket of journals is designed for a general 
audience. Papers published in these outlets can be cited 
by a wide variety of future research both within and 
outside of the ISP compliance space. 
On the other hand, however, this practice is 
problematic when the variety of behaviors in a specific 
domain are highly variable, which might negatively 
affect the application of generic research models to 
alternative contexts. We suggest that there is such 
behavioral variability in the ISP compliance space due 
to the variety of attacks and threats that employees are 
required to guard against on a daily basis. Therefore, 
we assert that it might not be plausible to construct a 
single model that covers all of the policies and 
procedures contained in an ISP document. To 
exemplify this issue, we consider an example of the US 
tax code. Is it possible to apply a single theory to model 
an individual’s propensity to follow all (or most) of the 
income tax rules and regulations contained in the US 
tax code? Given the depth and breadth of the US tax 
code, the answer is probably no. For instance, one 
model may adequately explain compliance with 
depreciation rules but inadequately explain 
compliance with capital gains regulations. Even with 
advanced tax prep software, different amounts of 
diligence and thought are required to comply with 
different sections of the tax code, which makes it 
problematic to construct a single model for all (or 
most) of the tax code.  




Similarly, in the ISP compliance context, we proffer 
that one set of behavioral antecedents may explain the 
majority of the variance for a high-effort threat-
specific security action, whereas a different set of 
behavioral antecedents may be better at explaining the 
variance for a low-effort threat-specific security 
action. Despite these behavioral differences across 
security actions, however, our literature review reveals 
that having the perception of broad generalization is a 
key hurdle that authors must clear in order to publish 
ISP compliance papers in one of our top journals. From 
a measurement perspective, researchers attempted to 
make these universal claims of generalization in one of 
the following ways: (1) ask generic (i.e., undefined 
security action) questions concerning the ISP and 
generalize down to specific actions; (2) aggregate 
responses to questions concerning multiple ISP-related 
threat-specific security actions; (3) aggregate scenario 
vignettes concerning multiple ISP-related threat-
specific security actions; or (4) qualitatively evaluate 
ISP compliance via case studies. Figure 1 displays our 
interpretation of the empirical evidence and the scope 




Figure 1. Empirical Evidence to Level of Generalization 
 
3.1 Generic Measures 
These measures refer to the ISP document as a whole 
(i.e., compliance with all, most, or many of the policies 
contained in the ISP document without referring to a 
specific policy, threat-specific security action, 
mitigating control, or countermeasure). Of the 17 
papers that attempted to construct universal models of 
general ISP compliance, 53% (9/17) of them used 
generic measures not specific to any policy or security 
threat. Many of these papers did not provide any type 
of justification for why a generic measure was used 
besides citing a prior study as their justification. Of the 
papers that did explicitly justify why they chose to 
measure compliance using generic measures, the 
reason given was that a single threat-specific security 
action would potentially inhibit understanding of 
individuals’ abilities to perform multiple security 
behaviors simultaneously (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; 
Posey et al., 2013). Based on this justification, it is 
unclear what types of security actions employees are 
performing simultaneously because the measurement 
items refer to an undefined set of security actions. 
Siponen and Vance (2014) used an analogy of traffic 
violations to argue that most individuals will probably 
indicate that they will, in general, follow the traffic 
rules, but they might not know all of the traffic rules 
when asked questions about specific rules of the road. 
We again consider our example of the US tax code to 
further exemplify the pitfalls with using these types of 
generic measures. We assume that most individuals, if 
asked, would indicate that they generally follow tax 
rules, but the US tax code is complicated. Therefore, if 
asked a direct question or presented with a scenario 
specifically concerning the depreciation schedule for 
an asset or the rules for a home deduction as a part of 
a small business expense, individuals would probably 
answer those questions differently due to the 
contextual differences between those two tax policies. 
There may be significant variability in the behavioral 
antecedents and underlying behavioral intentions from 
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rule to rule. We suspect that ISP compliance research 
using generic measures without grounding the 
questions with a threat-specific security action (or a 
specific mitigating control) will encounter similar 
issues due to the wide range of threat-specific security 
actions covered by a typical ISP. Therefore, we argue 
that it is difficult to derive any actionable conclusions 
from these types of generic measures because they do 
not capture any threat-specific security actions that are 
contained on the ISP document. If anything, we assert 
that these generic measures average out the effects 
across the ISP, which means that they are “on average” 
wrong (Savage, 2012, pp. 15-19). 
3.2 Specific Behavior Items 
Another measurement technique that papers in our top 
journals use to attempt to construct universal models 
of general ISP compliance is to capture responses for a 
threat-specific security action and generalize out to all 
(or most) other policies in the ISP. This type of 
measure captures specific behavioral intentions 
concerning, for instance, Internet usage (e.g., “I intend 
to comply with the Internet usage policies”), tailgating, 
phishing, or password-management ISP-directed 
behaviors. These measures capture one specific policy 
in the ISP document without contextualizing the 
security action to any specific type of situation (Moody 
et al., 2018). In our literature review, we found six 
papers that used this type of evidence and 66% (4/6) of 
them attempted to construct a universal model of ISP 
compliance using these types of specific behavioral 
items (i.e., the researchers saw evidence related to a 
single threat-specific security action and argued that 
other ISP-mandated actions would be similar). 
We assert that generalizing from a measure that 
captures a single threat-specific security action to all 
(or most) other policies contained in the ISP is 
problematic because not all policies require the same 
amount of time, difficulty, diligence, knowledge, and 
effort to comply (Posey et al., 2013; Workman et al., 
2008). These threat-to-threat differences may make the 
behavioral antecedents with each threat-specific 
security action different. For instance, we would not 
reasonably expect the behavioral antecedents 
associated with a socially interactive threat such as 
tailgating to have the same impact on compliance 
actions (or intentions thereof) as an individualized 
threat such as improper Internet usage (Aurigemma & 
Mattson, 2017). We argue that these two threat-
specific security actions may or may not have 
overlapping behavioral antecedents because the 
policy-directed actions across both threats are 
different, which makes creating a universal model of 
ISP compliance from this type of evidence 
problematic. 
3.3 Scenario Vignettes 
Another type of evidence that ISP compliance 
researchers have used to develop universal or pseudo-
universal models of ISP compliance is scenario 
vignettes. With this type of evidence, researchers 
develop a scenario vignette with a threat-specific 
security action and ask their research subjects to 
respond to the specific scenario. Many times, 
researchers ask their research subjects to respond to 
multiple scenario vignettes with different threat- 
specific security actions. Then, the researchers either 
aggregate all of the specific threats to a single metric 
or attempt to explain how their single threat-specific 
security action was representative of all, most, or many 
other threat-specific security actions contained in the 
ISP.  
For example, D’Arcy, Hovav, and Galletta (2009) 
justified their examination of composite behaviors in 
that the focus of their research was to explore 
generalized patterns of information system misuse 
instead of individual threat responses. By aggregating 
individual behavioral responses via the scenario 
vignettes, they argued that researchers may be able to 
predict generalized patterns of deviant behavior better 
than by collecting data on generic measures (D’Arcy 
et al., 2009). This argument may be valid, but if 
researchers are aggregating threats that require 
different actions, then we assert that they are 
essentially smoothing or averaging out the effects. We 
therefore question what, exactly, this smoothed-out 
aggregated metric of different threat-specific security 
actions is measuring. Similar to the generic measures 
of ISP compliance, we are not sure that this 
aggregation is capturing anything meaningful. If there 
is conceptual value in this type of aggregation, then 
what does it mean if the threats being aggregated are 
not representative of all types of threat-specific 
security actions required by the ISP? Most researchers 
would probably agree that aggregating a 
nonrepresentative sample of threat-specific security 
actions or aggregating vastly different security-related 
actions would be a problematic metric for any type of 
security-related behavior. 
Interestingly, most of the research in our literature 
review that investigated a single threat-specific 
security action via a scenario vignette or a specific 
behavior item explicitly recognized the limitation of 
constructing a universal model of general ISP 
compliance from a single threat-specific security 
action. For example, Johnston et al. (2016, p. 245) 
stated that “to some extent, the choice of one behavior 
limits the generalizability of the findings to other 
security misbehaviors” while still attempting to 
construct a rather universal model. Appendix A 
includes similar statements from most of the studies 
that investigated one or two threat-specific security 
actions while still attempting to construct a universal 
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model. Why is the research context a study limitation 
or a study weakness? A study limitation or weakness 
is, for example, having a biased sample, having an 
inadequate manipulation or an inadequate 
manipulation check, using incorrect statistical models, 
employing an unsystematic data gathering process, and 
making faulty mathematical assumptions (Lee, 1991). 
We posit that the specific ISP-related problem that is 
being investigated is not a study limitation. We would 
argue that solving one ISP-related problem well is 
theoretically more valuable than attempting to solve all 
ISP-related problems too generically. It is only 
perceived as a study limitation because our top journals 
have a strong preference for publishing universal 
models of ISP compliance instead of particular models 
related to a threat-specific security action. 
3.4 Qualitative Case Studies  
Two studies in our literature review used qualitative 
data to attempt to construct universal or pseudo-
universal models of ISP compliance (Hedström, 
Kolkowska, Karlsson, & Allen, 2011; Kolkowska, 
Karlsson & Hedström, 2017). Qualitative data can be 
a rich source of nonnumerical data that researchers can 
use to make a variety of scientific conclusions (Klein 
& Myers, 1999; Lee, 1991). For our context, 
qualitative interviews can be used to gather data on 
generic ISP behaviors (undefined security actions) or 
threat-specific security actions. Both the Hedström et 
al. (2011) and Kolkowska et al. (2017) papers 
investigated or proposed to investigate specific (actual) 
security behaviors via qualitative means in order to 
construct rather broad models of ISP compliance.11 
These two qualitative papers were particular in terms 
of industry (health care industries) but universal (or 
pseudo-universal) in terms of the types of ISP-related 
actions covered by their models. 
4 Research Design and Methods 
To empirically evaluate the challenges associated with 
constructing a universal model of ISP compliance from 
either generic measures or threat-specific security 
measures, we conducted two empirical studies 
comparing general compliance intentions (i.e., 
undefined security action) and threat-specific 
compliance intentions. In order to make these 
comparisons, we evaluated behavioral intentions 
across multiple threat-specific security actions and 
multiple theories. The threat-specific security actions 
that we investigated were phishing, tailgating, flash 
media, workstation locking, and password sharing.  
 
Figure 2. Theoretical Models 
 
11 Both of these papers were careful in stating how they could 
generalize their findings in their methods’ sections. 
However, they were much more liberal with their 
generalization statements in their discussion sections.  
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Table 2. Theory and Conceptual Descriptions of the Constructs 
Theory Construct Definition 
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) posits that individual behaviors are determined by personal attitudes (feeling of 
favorability or desirability) towards the behavior, subjective norms (perceived social pressures from co-workers) to perform a 
behavior, and perceived behavioral control (a belief that the action can be performed given reasonable obstacles) over the 








The perceived social pressure to engage or not to engage in a security-related 
behavior. Items adapted from Taylor and Todd (1995), Herath and Rao (2009) 
TPB Attitude (ATT) 
The self-reported degree to which performance of a security behavior is 





One’s perceived ability to perform a given behavior in the presence of factors 
that may facilitate or impede performing the behavior. Items adapted from 
Taylor & Todd (1995) 
In its simplest form, protection motivation theory (PMT) consists of an employee’s self-efficacy (belief in one’s ability) to 
perform a security action, the perceived response efficacy (perceived effectiveness) of the required action, the perception of their 
vulnerability (perceived likelihood that the threat will occur) from the related security threat, and the perceived severity 
(perceived impact of the threat) of the security threat being studied (Warkentin, Johnston, Shropshire, & Barnett, 2016). 
PMT Self-efficacy (SEFF) 
One’s perceived ability to successfully complete a security-related behavior. 




The extent one believes a recommended security response effectively deters or 
mitigates a threat. Items adapted from Rippetoe & Rogers (1987), Milne et al. 




One’s belief in how susceptible they feel to a specified security threat. Items 




One’s perception of how serious a security threat would be to themselves. 
Items adapted from Ng et al. (2009) 
Deterrence theory (DT) posits that a person weighs the probability of being caught (sanctioned) and the severity of the sanction 




One’s perception of how serious a penalty they would incur if they did not 
behave in accordance with formal security requirements. Items adapted from 




The perceived chance that one would get caught and punished for violating a 
required security behavior. Items adapted from Herath & Rao (2009) 
Rational choice theory (RCT) proffers that the determinants of an employee’s attitude originate in their beliefs about complying 
(or not complying) with the ISP and the consequences of their actions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
RCT 
Perceived cost of 
compliance (PCOMP) 
An estimate of the resources required and/or negative effects that result from 
complying with a required security behavior. Items adapted from Bulgurcu et 
al. (2010) 
RCT 
Perceived benefit of 
compliance (PBEN) 
An estimate of the personal rewards received from complying with the 
required security behavior. Items adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) 
RCT 
Perceived cost of 
noncompliance 
(PNCOMP) 
An estimate of the negative effects that result from failing to comply with the 
required security actions. Items adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) 
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These threat-specific security actions required different 
levels of time, difficulty, diligence, knowledge, and 
effort to comply with the ISP requirements, which 
provided us with sufficient behavioral variability to test 
threat-to-threat differences.12 Appendix B contains the 
detailed policy directed behaviors for these threat-
specific security actions in the two organizations that 
we studied. We also tested a generic measure of ISP 
compliance to compare whether the threat-specific 
security actions differed from generic ISP-related 
behaviors (or intentions thereof). 
We evaluated the different ISP-directed security actions 
and the generic measure of ISP compliance across four 
theories: (1) theory of planned behavior (TPB), (2) 
protection motivation theory (PMT), (3) rational choice 
theory (RCT), and (4) deterrence theory (DT). Existing 
ISP research has relied on a number of theories such as 
(among many others) neutralization theory, theory of 
interpersonal behavior, control balance theory, DT, 
TPB, PMT, and RCT in order to explain the variability 
in ISP-related behaviors (Crossler & Belanger, 2014; 
Moody et al., 2018). Researchers in this space have not 
agreed on which theory (or version of a theory) is the 
most appropriate to use for a specific situation, context, 
organization, ISP, sample, and threat-specific security 
action. In our paper, we used DT, TPB, PMT, and RCT 
because many of the most commonly used constructs 
reported in the prior literature are contained in at least 
one of these theoretical models. We make no claims 
that every construct that has been reported in the prior 
literature is contained in DT, TPB, PMT, and RCT. 
However, these four theories provide ample theoretical 
diversity to objectively test model fit, explanatory 
power, path sign, magnitude, and significance across 
the different threat-specific security actions as 
mandated by the ISP. Figure 2 shows the versions of 
each theory we used to investigate differences between 
general compliance and threat-specific security actions. 
Table 2 contains a brief textual description of each 
theory and the conceptual definitions of each construct 
contained in each theory.  
5 Study 1 
In Study 1, we compared phishing, tailgating, flash 
media, and a generic (undefined security action) 
measure of ISP compliance across TPB, PMT, DT, and 
RCT using a sample of US Department of Defense 
(DoD) employees (military and civilian). Using the 
same survey instrument, we evaluated employees’ self-
reported intent to comply with the ISP requirements for 
 
12  In addition to selecting these threat-specific security 
actions because the ISP mandated requirements were 
different, we also selected these actions based on our 
conversations with the senior IS leadership at the two 
organizations that we studied. These leaders informed us that 
phishing, tailgating, flash media, and a generic measure 
of ISP compliance. Based on the DoD ISP 
requirements, these three threat-specific security 
actions plus the generic measure of ISP compliance 
represent requirements for low interpersonal 
interactivity (phishing), high interpersonal interactivity 
(tailgating), situational interpersonal interactivity 
(improper flash media use), and indeterminate 
interpersonal interactivity (generic measure of ISP 
compliance). Each threat-specific security action also 
requires variable amounts of time, difficulty, diligence, 
knowledge, and effort to comply with the ISP-directed 
requirements. Appendix B displays the DoD’s 
requirements for each one of these threat-specific 
security actions, which shows the behavioral 
differences across each threat-specific activity. These 
differences provided us with the variance in ISP-
directed behaviors necessary to test differences across 
the different theories and threat-specific security 
actions. 
At the time of our data collection, the DoD employed 
approximately 3.5 million military and civilian 
personnel. Every DoD employee (military and civilian) 
fell under the purview of the same ISP guidelines. At 
the time of our study, the DoD’s ISP contained policies 
and procedures relating to 26 specific threats and their 
associated mitigating security actions. All participants 
in our study were required to pass an annual test with a 
70% passing threshold concerning their ISP 
requirements in order to gain and maintain access to 
DoD electronic systems. Therefore, the presence of a 
codified set of ISPs, a robust security awareness and 
training program, an annual test pertaining to the ISP, 
and an organizational leadership that values the 
importance of information security made the DoD an 
excellent organization to test different models of ISP 
compliance. 
5.1 Primary Data Collection 
We adapted all of our measurement items from 
prevalidated scales taken from previous research. 13 
Appendix B contains all of our measurement items. We 
measured all items reflectively using 7-point Likert 
scales. The order of the questions was randomized for 
each survey participant. Each survey participant 
answered all of the questions pertaining to the three 
threat-specific security actions and the generic 
measures. Our study participants had the option of 
completing the survey either online or on paper. We 
designed and administered the survey using best 
practices related to instruction wording (pp. 65-105) 
they saw (anecdotally) different patterns of compliance with 
these particular threat-specific security actions. 
13 We used prevalidated scales because we wanted to use the 
same/similar scales that have been used in the prior ISP 
compliance literature. We did confirm discriminant and 
convergent validity on these scales for our dataset. 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1710 
and question order (pp. 157-165) by Dillman et al. 
(2014). Additionally, in order to remedy potential 
common method bias procedurally via our instrument, 
we introduced a proximal separation between the 
measures of the independent and dependent variables 
along with using both positive and negative line items 
in our survey instrument (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & 
Podsakoff, 2012). We piloted the survey instrument 
twice. The first pilot was with three DoD security 
management practitioners and the second pilot was 
with 20 DoD personnel and academics. As a result of 
each pilot, we made minor changes to the organization, 
structure, and content of the survey instrument. 
A total of 1,380 DoD employees had the opportunity to 
participate in the final survey. Participation was 
completely voluntary and participants were assured of 
their anonymity (i.e., we obtained no identifying 
information during data collection). None of these 
survey participants received any monetary 
compensation for participating. After follow-ups, we 
collected a total of 239 completed surveys. Another 15 
participants had a random collection of missing 
responses throughout their survey. For these 15 
participants, we used the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method in MPlus (v8) (Kline, 2016, 
p. 86). Therefore, our final analysis included 254 data 
points (67 enlisted, 115 officers, and 72 civilians).14 To 
compare potential instrument bias between paper 
(n=50) and online (n=204) testing, we ran ANOVAs 
between the two groups of responders on each variable, 
which revealed no aggregate construct level 
differences, but there were several individual item 
differences. Finally, we successfully screened our 254 
data points for issues that may have jeopardized our 
results, such as outliers, multicollinearity, and 
nonnormality (Kline, 2016, pp. 71-77). 
5.2 Data Analysis and Results 
We analyzed our research models using covariance-
based structural equation modeling (CBSEM) (MPlus 
v8). Due to the nature of our data collection (i.e., cross-
sectional data during the same time period collected via 
a self-reported questionnaire), common method 
variance attributed to measurement method instead of 
the constructs of interest may have biased our results 
(Podsakoff et al., 2012). To test for common method 
variance, we used the unmeasured latent method 
construct (ULMC) factor approach discussed by 
Podsakoff et al. (2012). Comparing the standardized 
loadings of the items on their respective constructs 
between CFAs with and without the ULMC marker 
 
14 We could not determine how many of the 1,380 potential 
participants actually received the survey requests or the 
follow-ups (i.e., the emails may have been filtered to spam 
and/or were never opened by the potential participants). 
construct, the average difference across all items’ 
standardized loadings was less than 0.01 (with a 
maximum difference of 0.07) and none of the measured 
construct items loaded significantly on the marker 
construct. Additionally, the average variance extracted 
(AVE) from the ULMC in all threat conditions was less 
than 0.06, which indicated that the ULMC contributed 
very little of the overall variance explained by the CFA 
model. While the results of the ULMC analysis and the 
above design choices do not negate the possibility of 
bias, we did not find evidence of common method 
variance in our dataset. 
We performed a separate confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) for each threat-specific security action and for 
the generic measure because we tested each separately. 
Table 3 displays our CFA results. Based on the criteria 
set forth by Petter, Straub, and Rai (2007), all of the 
construct measures met the requirements to be 
considered reflective indicators of their respective 
latent constructs for all three threat-specific security 
action measures plus the generic measures. While the 
recommended threshold for item loadings is 0.7, 
individual item loadings between 0.40 and 0.70 are 
acceptable for inclusion as long as composite 
reliabilities are above 0.70, which they were for all of 
our measurement items (Chin, 1998). The average 
variance extracted (AVE) is a measure of the amount of 
variance that is captured by a construct in relation to the 
amount of variance due to measurement error; AVE 
values above 0.5 are evidence of convergent validity, 
which was the case for our data (Fornell & Larker, 
1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005). We verified discriminant 
validity across all three threat-specific security action 
measures plus the generic measures by comparing the 
difference between the AVE of each construct and its 
correlations with other constructs. To achieve sufficient 
discriminant validity, the square root of AVE of a 
construct should be greater than its correlations with all 
other constructs (Gefen & Straub, 2005), which was the 
case for all of our constructs (i.e., see the diagonal in 
Table 3). 
Next, we evaluated the model fit for the CFA analysis, 
which included all latent constructs tested 
simultaneously across our four models: generic 
measures (χ2 = 984.7, df = 587, p = 0.12,15 CFI = 0.947, 
RMSEA = 0.054), tailgating (χ2 = 1314.3, df = 587, p = 
0.31, CFI = 0.906, RMSEA = 0.073), phishing 
(χ2=1171.1, df = 587, p = 0.22, CFI = 0.924, RMSEA = 
0.065), and flash media use (χ2=1190.2, df = 587, p = 
0.21, CFI = 0.924, RMSEA = 0.067).  
15 We report the Bollen-Stine p value (with 1000 bootstrap 
iterations) and Yuan-Bentler corrected χ2 values in our paper 
because our data were not perfectly normal and deviations 
from normality have been known to inflate the chi-square 
values (Bollen & Stine, 1992). 
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Measure CR AVE PBEN BINT SEFF PVUL TSEV REFF SNORM PBC ATT SSEV SPROB PCOMP PNCOMP
PBEN 0.809 0.589 0.767
BINT 0.979 0.939 0.372 0.969
SEFF 0.960 0.889 0.250 0.472 0.943
PVUL 0.936 0.830 0.119 0.120 0.069 0.911
TSEV 0.939 0.836 0.364 0.374 0.259 0.324 0.914
REFF 0.898 0.746 0.470 0.342 0.304 -0.004 0.340 0.864
SNORM 0.804 0.581 0.376 0.654 0.400 0.004 0.227 0.415 0.762
PBC 0.889 0.727 0.430 0.478 0.797 0.104 0.217 0.278 0.440 0.853
ATT 0.946 0.854 0.349 0.612 0.668 0.041 0.242 0.306 0.556 0.622 0.924
SSEV 0.771 0.529 0.378 0.275 0.198 0.049 0.303 0.570 0.380 0.303 0.202 0.727
SPROB 0.770 0.628 0.407 0.298 0.123 0.028 0.232 0.598 0.333 0.163 0.220 0.635 0.792
PCOMP 0.900 0.753 -0.203 -0.186 -0.259 0.157 -0.097 -0.250 -0.199 -0.266 -0.185 0.023 -0.110 0.868
PNCOMP 0.788 0.554 0.672 0.303 0.126 0.130 0.454 0.521 0.237 0.193 0.169 0.556 0.473 0.007 0.744
Phishing CR AVE PBEN BINT SEFF PVUL TSEV REFF SNORM PBC ATT SSEV SPROB PCOMP PNCOMP
PBEN 0.810 0.589 0.767
BINT 0.966 0.904 0.365 0.951
SEFF 0.976 0.933 0.322 0.444 0.966
PVUL 0.922 0.798 0.118 0.157 0.090 0.893
TSEV 0.940 0.838 0.403 0.391 0.166 0.322 0.916
REFF 0.900 0.750 0.447 0.296 0.249 -0.225 0.228 0.866
SNORM 0.834 0.628 0.364 0.665 0.418 0.070 0.261 0.317 0.792
PBC 0.875 0.700 0.396 0.514 0.779 0.011 0.244 0.377 0.520 0.837
ATT 0.936 0.829 0.417 0.606 0.592 -0.021 0.323 0.389 0.501 0.711 0.911
SSEV 0.816 0.596 0.416 0.179 0.169 -0.095 0.244 0.572 0.294 0.282 0.293 0.772
SPROB 0.786 0.650 0.412 0.227 0.153 -0.013 0.204 0.457 0.221 0.183 0.318 0.641 0.806
PCOMP 0.933 0.822 -0.222 -0.239 -0.325 0.041 -0.149 -0.148 -0.226 -0.313 -0.224 0.033 -0.052 0.907
PNCOMP 0.785 0.551 0.619 0.288 0.136 0.102 0.449 0.456 0.288 0.131 0.197 0.519 0.484 -0.037 0.742
Removable 
Flash Media CR AVE PBEN BINT SEFF PVUL TSEV REFF SNORM PBC ATT SSEV SPROB PCOMP PNCOMP
PBEN 0.865 0.681 0.825
BINT 0.982 0.949 0.305 0.974
SEFF 0.971 0.919 0.203 0.534 0.959
PVUL 0.911 0.776 0.139 0.164 0.037 0.881
TSEV 0.937 0.832 0.365 0.286 0.206 0.230 0.912
REFF 0.892 0.735 0.438 0.187 0.288 -0.008 0.253 0.857
SNORM 0.848 0.657 0.442 0.648 0.302 0.036 0.109 0.341 0.810
PBC 0.873 0.697 0.209 0.480 0.941 0.078 0.252 0.328 0.301 0.835
ATT 0.956 0.878 0.418 0.579 0.463 0.117 0.315 0.309 0.569 0.523 0.937
SSEV 0.772 0.532 0.325 0.254 0.236 -0.033 0.273 0.450 0.327 0.261 0.303 0.730
SPROB 0.692 0.534 0.267 0.193 0.256 0.013 0.223 0.391 0.133 0.262 0.210 0.600 0.731
PCOMP 0.883 0.717 -0.268 -0.237 -0.268 0.205 -0.072 -0.247 -0.210 -0.303 -0.363 -0.035 -0.009 0.847
PNCOMP 0.779 0.543 0.558 0.230 0.218 0.039 0.524 0.365 0.150 0.231 0.201 0.538 0.446 -0.003 0.737
Tailgating CR AVE PBEN BINT SEFF PVUL TSEV REFF SNORM PBC ATT SSEV SPROB PCOMP PNCOMP
PBEN 0.825 0.613 0.783
BINT 0.942 0.844 0.495 0.918
SEFF 0.964 0.898 0.238 0.499 0.948
PVUL 0.925 0.805 0.062 0.067 0.082 0.897
TSEV 0.941 0.843 0.350 0.180 0.139 0.330 0.918
REFF 0.927 0.810 0.472 0.315 0.123 -0.119 0.192 0.900
SNORM 0.850 0.658 0.478 0.738 0.331 -0.071 0.071 0.453 0.811
PBC 0.872 0.695 0.280 0.388 0.853 0.165 0.166 0.162 0.301 0.834
ATT 0.895 0.740 0.352 0.381 0.492 0.026 0.236 0.222 0.347 0.564 0.860
SSEV 0.842 0.641 0.528 0.373 0.125 -0.070 0.259 0.728 0.447 0.180 0.288 0.801
SPROB 0.817 0.692 0.388 0.353 0.100 -0.033 0.151 0.613 0.353 0.139 0.217 0.741 0.832
PCOMP 0.940 0.840 -0.239 -0.205 -0.303 0.112 -0.121 -0.222 -0.247 -0.356 -0.219 -0.077 -0.044 0.916
PNCOMP 0.831 0.623 0.624 0.370 0.107 0.054 0.399 0.512 0.329 0.176 0.156 0.558 0.446 -0.151 0.789
Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Perceived Vulnerability to Threat (PVUL), Perceived Threat Severity (TSEV), 
Response Efficacy (REFF), Subjective Norms (SNORM), Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC), Attitude (ATT), Perceived Sanction Severity (SSEV), 
Perceived Sanction Probability (SPROB), Perceived Cost of Compliance (PCOMP), Perceived Cost of non-Compliance (PNCOMP) 
Note: Off diagonal numbers are interconstruct correlations; diagonal numbers are the square roots of AVE (average variance extracted).
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Then, following the two-step modeling approach 
recommended by Kline (2011, p. 267), we conducted 
nested model comparisons between the CFA and the 
structural models for each theory and threat condition. 
In these nested model comparisons, the chi-square 
difference test was not significant (passing) for all of 
the CFA-structural model tests for each theory and all 
threat-specific security actions. As a final data check, 
we conducted factor invariance tests between the 
different threat-specific security actions and the 
generic measures for all four theories to make sure that 
the items used in the survey instrument loaded on the 
same construct across the threats. These tests 
satisfactorily showed both configural and metric 
invariance, which enabled us to conduct the statistical 
tests between the groups (Kline, 2016, p. 396). 
Table 4 and Table 5 display the CBSEM model results 
for all three threat-specific security actions plus the 
generic measures for all four theories. In accordance 
with the supporting theory for the model, we used three 
main criteria to compare each theoretical model in 
terms of the different threat-specific security actions 
and the generic measures of (1) model fit, (2) 
dependent variable variance explained (R2), and (3) 
path coefficient magnitude, sign, and significance of 
the antecedent variables. 
For model fit, Kline (2016, pp. 273-277) recommends 
reporting χ2, degrees of freedom (df), and p values as 
this is the only true statistical test of CBSEM model fit; 
all other measures are called “approximate fit indices” 
and are considered descriptive in nature. However, 
“model fit can be assessed inferentially by the χ2 test 
or descriptively by applying other criteria” 
(Schermelleh-Engel & Moosbrugger, 2003 p. 31). In 
the strictest interpretation, if the chi-square model fit 
test fails (p < 0.05), then that specific model has 
inadequate model fit. However, there are several 
shortcomings to the χ2 test related to violation of χ2 
distribution assumptions (normality, multivariate 
normality, sufficient sample size) that are not normally 
met in many practical applications of CBSEM due to 
model complexity (Schermelleh-Engel & 
Moosbrugger, 2003). That said, some researchers warn 
against trying to justify retaining a model based solely 
on approximate fit statistics, especially if the model 
failed the chi-square test (Barrett, 2007).  
Table 4. CBSEM Model Fit Results for Study 1 
Model χ2 df p CFI RMSEA 
Theory of planned behavior  
Generic measure 96.638 48 0.359 0.983 0.065 
Improper flash media 222.945 48 0.028 0.943 0.124 
Phishing 249.525 48 0.01 0.927 0.133 
Tailgating 214.511 48 0.141 0.922 0.121 
Protection motivation theory 
Generic measure 140.591 80 0.222 0.984 0.056 
Improper flash media 135.239 80 0.337 0.986 0.054 
Phishing 109.538 80 0.471 0.992 0.039 
Tailgating 168.488 80 0.166 0.975 0.068 
Deterrence theory 
Generic measure 48.732 17 0.028 0.98 0.088 
Improper flash media 29.218 17 0.232 0.992 0.055 
Phishing 25.126 17 0.2 0.994 0.045 
Tailgating 43.716 17 0.02 0.979 0.080 
Rational choice theory 
Generic measure 113.943 83 0.429 0.989 0.039 
Improper flash media 180.002 83 0.051 0.969 0.070 
Phishing 165.400 83 0.112 0.971 0.065 
Tailgating 183.842 83 0.138 0.959 0.072 
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Theory of planned behavior 
R2 (BINT) 0.528 0.526 0.544 0.588 
SNORM → BINT 0.355*** 0.326*** 0.319*** 0.487*** 
ATT → BINT 0.320*** 0.169** 0.280*** 0.089(NS) 
PBC → BINT 0.059(NS) 0.191*** 0.006(NS) 0.101 (p=0.08) 
Protection motivation theory 
R2 (BINT) 0.32 0.333 0.33 0.323 
TSEV → BINT 0.111*** 0.09** 0.118*** 0.035(NS) 
PVUL → BINT 0.005(NS) 0.037(p=0.074) 0.02(NS) 0.015(NS) 
REFF → BINT 0.105* 0.007(NS) 0.084* 0.158*** 
SEFF → BINT 0.308*** 0.494*** 0.220*** 0.471*** 
Deterrence theory 
R2 (BINT) 0.101 0.074 0.055 0.155 
SPROB → BINT 0.109* 0.053(NS) 0.084 (p=.066) 0.088(NS) 
SSEV → BINT 0.068(NS) 0.105* 0.02(NS) 0.124* 
Rational choice theory 
R2 (BINT)  0.38  0.339  0.361  0.151 
R2 (ATT)  0.142  0.239  0.193  0.161 
PBEN → ATT  0.157***  0.174***  0.225***  0.211*** 
PCOMP → ATT -0.037(NS) -0.133*** -0.053* -0.06* 
PNCOMP → ATT -0.031(NS)  0.013(NS) -0.032(NS) -0.052(NS) 
ATT → BINT  0.643***  0.500***  0.455***  0.438*** 
Notes: For ease of visually differentiating significant and nonsignificant path relationships in the CBSEM results, we used NS 
to signify not significant. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
BINT: Behavioral Intent, ATT: Attitude, PBC: Perceived Behavioral Control, SPROB: Perceived Sanction Probability, 
SSEV: Sanction Severity, SEFF: Self-Efficacy, TSEV: Perceived Threat Severity, PVUL: Perceived Vulnerability, REFF: 
Response Efficacy, PBEN: Perceived Benefit from Compliance, PCOMP: Perceived Benefit from Complying, PNCOMP: 
Perceived Cost from Noncompliance, NS: Not Significant (p > 0.1).  
 
In our paper, we evaluated the performance of four 
established theoretical models of human behavior 
across a range of threat-specific security actions. Our 
goal was not to present a new model and justify its fit 
as good or bad or recommend changes to the 
underlying model. Instead, our goal was to compare 
how these baseline models vary within the same 
sample of participants while varying only the threat 
condition. Thus, we report both the χ2 test results and 
approximate fit indices (CFI and RMSEA) to allow 
readers the opportunity to assess the results of our 
analyses both inferentially and/or descriptively. While 
there is debate on what constitutes a satisfactory 
threshold value for different fit indices, in this paper 
we use CFI > 0.90 and RMSEA < 0.10 as descriptive 
indicators of adequate model fit (see Schermelleh-
Engel & Moosbrugger (2003) for a discussion on fit 
indices). It should be noted, however, that not all of the 
approximate fit metrics need to be below or above the 
recommended cutoffs for the overall model fit to be 
considered acceptable (Gefen et al., 2011). When 
comparing models with otherwise similar 
characteristics, the model with the better overall fit 
metrics is generally considered superior. In our data, 
both inferential and descriptive model fit varied widely 
by both theory and threat-specific security actions. 
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The model fit results for the TPB show the most 
variability (see Table 4). Only the models related to the 
generic measure (undefined security action) and 
tailgating threat-specific security action passed the χ2 
fit test. Additionally, the tailgating threat approximate 
fit indices were markedly worse than the generic 
measurement model (including an unsatisfactory 
RMSEA). What does this mean? If one were to 
evaluate generic measures alone for the TPB model, 
one could inaccurately conclude that the TPB model fit 
is acceptable for all threat-specific security actions, 
which is clearly not the case for both the flash media 
and phishing threat-specific security actions (and 
possibly for the tailgating threat-specific security 
action). When a model fails the inferential χ2 test, a 
researcher may take steps to attempt to resolve the 
model fit issues, such as reexamining the data for 
distributional violations, deleting additional outlier 
data, dropping some items from construct 
measurement, or even changing the fundamental 
structure of the model (as long as this is theoretically 
justifiable) (Barrett, 2007). In our paper, however, we 
are trying to determine if model fit is different between 
threat conditions, not why. Thus, in our sample of the 
same participants surveyed with validated and 
consistent items related to well-established theoretical 
models, we can draw conclusions about generalization 
problems from the fact that model fit fails in one threat-
specific security action but passes in another threat-
specific security action or in the generic undefined 
security condition. Of the models evaluated, only PMT 
shows consistent inferential and descriptive model fit 
results across the threat-specific security actions and 
the generic undefined security condition. 
Comparing the R2 values across models allows us to 
determine which model explains the most amount of 
variance of our dependent variables. All other things 
being equal, the model with the highest R2 is 
considered superior. In our data, the R2 values were 
fairly consistent across all models and threat-specific 
security actions with one exception: the R2 associated 
with RCT and the tailgating threat-specific security 
action explained less than half of the variance in 
behavioral intent compared with the other threat-
specific security actions that we evaluated using RCT. 
However, in all cases other than the above exception, 
the R2 explained by the generic measures (undefined 
security action) was the lowest across all models 
compared with the other ISP-mandated threat-specific 
security actions. 
Of these CBSEM model evaluation criteria, however, 
arguably the most important in terms of comparing our 
model results are the path coefficients and their 
theorized relationships. Confirming the characteristics 
 
16  We were able to run these multigroup statistical tests 
comparing the beta coefficients because both configural and 
of variable relationships is the distinguishing mark of 
a successful or unsuccessful ISP compliance model. 
After all, one of the main goals of ISP compliance 
research is to better understand the behavioral 
antecedents of ISP-directed behaviors (and intentions 
thereof). In our data, we observed considerable 
variability in the path coefficients for each theoretical 
model across the three threat-specific action measures 
and the generic measures. The generic measures and 
the phishing threat-specific security action had similar 
variable path characteristics (i.e., significance and 
similar coefficient magnitudes) for the TPB, DT, and 
PMT. However, the path characteristics for the other 
threat-specific security actions varied across all four 
theoretical models. In these instances, one or more 
variables were significant when we measured general 
ISP compliance intentions but were not significant 
when we measured a specific ISP-related security 
action (and vice versa).  
To assess the statistical magnitude of the differences in 
construct path coefficients, we conducted Wald χ2 tests 
to determine if the difference in coefficients was 
statistically significant (Muthen & Muthen, 2015 p. 
711).16 Table 6 displays the results for these multigroup 
statistical tests between all pairs of threat-specific 
security actions along with the undefined security 
action. These tests reveal that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the different 
measurement techniques for certain path coefficients. 
For instance, in the PMT model, self-efficacy is 
strongly significant for all three threat-specific security 
actions plus the generic undefined security measure. 
However, self-efficacy is a statistically stronger 
contributor to behavioral intent in the flash media and 
tailgating threat-specific security actions than for the 
generic and phishing threat-specific security actions. 
This type of differentiation on the relative importance 
of a behavioral antecedent would have been missed 
had we not examined the different threat-specific 
security actions. Likewise, a similar condition exists in 
the RCT model regarding the impact of the perceived 
cost of complying with a security action on attitudes 
towards that security behavior. This path is significant 
for all but the generic undefined security action, but 
there is a statistically significant difference in the 
coefficients between the flash media and tailgating 
threat-specific security actions. Therefore, the 
statistically significant beta coefficient differences 
provide some evidence that suggests we should be 
cautious about making speculative claims of universal 
generalization that have been made in the prior ISP 
compliance literature. 
metric invariance were established in our data (Kline, 2016, 
p. 396). 
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Table 6. Study 1 Path Coefficient Differences 
Theory of planned behavior Deterrence theory 
SNORM → BINT   GEN FL PH SPROB → BINT   GEN FL PH 
  FL 0.029       FL 0.056     
  PH 0.036 0.007     PH 0.025 0.031   
  TG 0.132 0.161* 0.168*   TG 0.021 0.035 0.004 
ATT → BINT   GEN FL PH SSEV → BINT   GEN FL PH 
  FL 0.151       FL 0.037     
  PH 0.04 0.112     PH 0.066 0.103   
  TG 0.231* 0.08 0.191*   TG 0.056 0.019 0.122 
PBC → BINT   GEN FL PH           
  FL 0.132*               
  PH 0.053 0.185*             
  TG 0.042 0.09 0.095           
Protection motivation theory Rational choice theory 
TSEV → BINT   GEN FL PH PBEN → ATT   GEN FL PH 
  FL 0.029       FL 0.017     
  PH 0.036 0.007     PH 0.068 0.051   
  TG 0.132 0.161* 0.168*   TG 0.054 0.037 0.014 
PVUL → BINT   GEN FL PH PCOMP → ATT   GEN FL PH 
  FL 0.151       FL 0.096     
  PH 0.04 0.112     PH 0.016 0.08   
  TG 0.231* 0.08 0.191*   TG 0.031 0.127* 0.047 
REFF → BINT   GEN FL PH PNCOMP → ATT   GEN FL PH 
  FL 0.132*       FL 0.018     
  PH 0.053 0.185*     PH 0.001 0.019   
  TG 0.042 0.09 0.095   TG 0.016 0.039 0.02 
SEFF → BINT   GEN FL PH ATT → BINT   GEN FL PH 
  FL 0.186*       FL 0.143*     
  PH 0.088 0.274*     PH 0.188* 0.045   
  TG 0.163* 0.09 0.251*   TG 0.205* 0.062 0.017 
Notes:  
BINT: Behavioral Intent, ATT: Attitude, PBC: Perceived Behavioral Control, SPROB: Perceived Sanctional Probability, SSEV: 
Sanction Severity, SEFF: Self-Efficacy, TSEV: Perceived Threat Severity, PVUL: Perceived Vulnerability, REFF: Response Efficacy, 
PBEN: Perceived Benefit from Compliance, PCOMP: Perceived Benefit from Complying, PNCOMP: Perceived Cost from 
Noncompliance., GEN: Generic Measure, FL: Improper Flash Media Use, PH: Phishing, TG: Tailgating. 
* means passed the Wald Chi-square significance test confirming a statistically significant difference for that model path between the 
two reference security threat conditions.  
Cell numbers indicate the difference between the coefficient values for the two corresponding constructs. 
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5.3 Study 1 Limitations 
Our first study had two primary limitations. First, we 
had a lack of variance in our dependent variables 
across the three threat-specific security actions and the 
generic undefined security action measures, which is 
similar to the limitation of several published studies in 
our literature review such as Bulgurcu et al. (2010). In 
our sample, most of our study participants did intend 
to comply with the policies and procedures contained 
in the ISP. Therefore, the model differences that we 
observed were in relation to employees who generally 
intended to follow the rules. Our first study does not 
offer empirical evidence for employees or individuals 
on the other end of the spectrum (i.e., employees who 
had a lesser tendency to follow the rules and 
regulations contained in the ISP). The fact that the 
DoD has a culture of compliance and conformity is a 
positive aspect of the DoD culture but other 
organizations may not have this type of information 
security culture. 
Second, our measures captured current behaviors (self-
reported) via behavior statements (i.e., “If I were 
caught violating the tailgating requirements of the ISP, 
I would be severely punished”) without 
contextualizing the threat-specific security actions in 
any type of scenario or real-life use-case. Per Moody 
et al. (2018), capturing current behaviors is valuable 
but adding context to the security actions is also 
valuable to evaluate relationships in different 
situations. Using scenario vignettes and adding context 
to hypothetical situations is one alternative to account 
for these types of situational effects (Moody et al., 
2018; Siponen & Vance, 2010). This scenario 
approach can reduce the potential for positive response 
bias and can capture prospective behavioral intentions 
instead of retrospective intentions that may be captured 
in the behavior statement approach (D’Arcy et al., 
2009; Moody et al., 2018; Pogarsky, 2004; Siponen & 
Vance, 2010). With these two limitations in mind, we 
designed and executed our second study. 
6 Study 2 
In Study 2, we collected data from a private university 
in the US that had an ISP that applied to both 
employees and other users (such as students and 
visitors) who accessed the university’s information 
resources. The ISP-directed behaviors that we 
investigated were workstation locking and password 
sharing along with a generic undefined security action 
measure. Similar to Study 1, these two ISP-directed 
security actions were different based on the mandated 
requirements. Based on the ISP requirements at the 
time of our study, their requirements ranged from low 
interpersonal interaction (workstation locking) to high 
interpersonal interaction (password sharing). These 
two threat-specific security actions also varied 
significantly in terms of the level of thought and effort 
required to comply with the ISP-directed policies. 
Appendix B displays the university’s requirements for 
each one of these threat-specific security actions, 
which shows the behavioral differences across each 
threat-specific security action. We evaluated these 
security actions along the same theoretical lines of the 
TPB, PMT, DT, and RCT that we used in Study 1. 
At the time of our study, the ISP for this private 
university covered roughly 5,500 faculty, staff, 
visitors, and students. In contrast to the DoD, however, 
the university’s employees and students were not 
subject to rigorous annual training and testing on ISP 
requirements. They only had to affirm that they would 
follow the ISP when they first received their university 
accounts, logged onto university-owned computers, 
and connected to university wireless networks (via a 
captive portal) while using personal computing 
devices. Therefore, this setting provided a nice contrast 
to the DoD environment. However, we still wanted to 
ensure that all of our study participants were aware of 
the ISP content because the ISP content is a core 
component of ISP-related research. As such, our online 
survey instrument provided a link to the official ISP 
along with the text of the ISP specifically related to 
workstation locking and passwords at the beginning of 
our survey instrument. Participants were required to 
acknowledge that they understood this ISP content 
before they could access the survey questions. 
6.1 Primary Data Collection 
We adapted all of our measurement items from 
prevalidated scales taken from previous research. The 
generic measurement items were the same in both 
Study 1 and Study 2. Similar to Study 1, each survey 
participant answered all of the questions pertaining to 
both threat-specific security actions and the generic 
measures. The order of the questions was randomized 
for each survey participant. All latent construct items 
were measured using 7-point Likert scales (both 
negative and positive). However, we used scenario 
vignettes in Study 2 to capture the threat-specific 
security actions instead of the behavioral statements 
that we used in Study 1. We used Moody et al. (2018) 
and Siponen and Vance (2010) as our guides to 
construct the two scenarios related to workstation 
locking and password sharing compliance. The 
scenarios specifically identified that the potential 
security action in the vignette was forbidden by the 
ISP. Appendix B contains the actual scenarios along 
with the full list of measurement items that we used in 
Study 2. 
We designed and administered the survey following 
the same best practices we used in Study 1. However, 
Study 2 incorporated more negatively worded 
questions than Study 1. We piloted the survey 
instrument twice. The first pilot was with a group of 10 
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employees and 10 students. The first pilot started with 
the same workstation locking and password sharing 
scenarios found in Siponen and Vance (2010) and 
Moody et al. (2018). However, based on feedback 
from the first pilot study, we modified the scenarios to 
tailor the vignettes based on whether the survey 
participant was an employee or a student. After we 
made this modification, we performed a second pilot 
study. The second pilot included 10 participants (five 
employees and five students) who participated in the 
first pilot study along with an additional 20 participants 
(10 employees and 10 students). As a result of the 
second pilot study, we made minor adjustments to the 
instructions to remove any potential sources of 
ambiguity. 
A total of 1,263 participants (organizational employees 
and students) were invited to voluntarily participate in 
the study without any monetary compensation. 
Participants were assured of their anonymity before 
agreeing to participate. Unlike in Study 1, study 
participants in Study 2 only had the option of 
participating online. After all follow-up emails, we 
collected a total of 231 responses (102 employees and 
129 students) of which 11 had a random collection of 
missing responses throughout their surveys. For these 
11 participants, we used the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method in MPlus (v8) (Kline, 2016, 
p. 86). Similar to Study 1, we could not determine how 
many of the 1,263 potential Study 2 participants 
actually received and read the survey requests or the 
follow-up emails. A weakness of Study 1 was a lack of 
variance in our dependent variables. This issue was not 
prevalent in Study 2. 
6.2 Data Analysis and Results 
We used CBSEM in MPlus (v8) to analyze our data. 
We assessed the potential adverse impact of common 
method variance in Study 2 in the same manner as 
Study 1 using the ULMC factor approach, which 
(similar to Study 1) did not provide any evidence of the 
presence of common method variance in our dataset. 
We performed a separate CFA for both threat-specific 
security actions and for the general undefined security 
action condition because we tested each separately. 
Table 7 displays our CFA results and the correlation 
matrix.17 The results of our CFA analyses revealed that 
all of our constructs met the requirements to be 
considered reflective indicators for their respective 
constructs for both threat-specific security actions and 
the generic undefined security action (Petter et al., 
 
17  As displayed in Table 5, self-efficacy and perceived 
behavioral control (PBC) were highly correlated. This high 
level of correlation is not surprising because there are 
similarities between these two constructs. As such, many 
researchers have justified using self-efficacy as a substitute 
2007). All composite reliabilities were above 0.7 for 
all of our tested threat-specific security actions and the 
generic undefined security action, which is evidence of 
convergent validity. The square root of the AVE for 
each of our constructs was greater than its correlations 
with all of the other constructs, which is evidence of 
divergent validity. Next, we evaluated the model fit for 
the CFA analysis, which included all latent constructs 
tested simultaneously for all four models: generic 
measures (χ2 = 1070.3, df = 624, Bollen-Stine p = 
0.126, CFI = 0.944, RMSEA = 0.057), workstation 
locking (χ2 = 1072.9, df= 624, Bollen-Stine p = 0.3, 
CFI = 0.906, RMSEA = 0.058), and password sharing 
(χ2 = 1450.8, df = 624, Bollen-Stine p = 0.11, CFI = 
0.916, RMSEA = 0.079). We also evaluated nested 
model comparisons using the same procedures as we 
used in Study 1, which were not statistically 
significant. Finally, we conducted invariance tests 
using the same procedures from Study 1 between the 
different threat-specific security actions and the 
generic undefined security action measures for all four 
theories, which satisfactorily showed both configural 
and metric invariance. Table 8 and Table 9 display the 
CBSEM model results for both threat-specific security 
actions (workstation locking and password sharing) 
plus the generic undefined security action measures for 
all four theories. 
Similar to Study 1, in Study 2 we compared the 
CBSEM model results across each theoretical model 
and threat-specific security action including the 
generic undefined security action measures using 
model fit, dependent variable variance explained (R2), 
and path coefficient magnitude, sign, and significance. 
As shown in Table 8, all three of the TPB model runs 
failed the χ2 fit test (with satisfactory CFI and mediocre 
to unsatisfactory RMSEA values). Model fit for PMT 
was satisfactory for all threat-specific security actions, 
but the overall fit for the generic undefined security 
action measure was notably better (lower χ2 and 
RMSEA, higher CFI) than the other threat-specific 
security actions (with the password sharing threat 
having the poorest overall fit statistics). For the DT, 
only the password sharing threat-specific security 
action passed the χ2 test. Lastly, for the RCT model, 
the workstation locking threat condition failed the χ2 
test. Thus, as in Study 1, the Study 2 disparate model 
fit results across threat-specific security actions within 
the four theoretical models make it difficult to justify 
generalizing from the generic undefined security 
action measures to the tested specific threat-specific 
security actions (and vice versa). 
for PBC under certain circumstances (Aurigemma & 
Mattson, 2017, Bulgurcu et al., 2010). However, this 
correlation is not an issue in our study because we do not use 
both self-efficacy and PBC in the same model for any of our 
analyses other than the CFA. 
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Table 7. CFA Validity and Construct Correlations for Study 2 
 
 
Generic Measure CR AVE PNCOMP BINT SEFF PVUL TSEV REFF SNORM PBC ATT SSEV SPROB PCOMP PBEN
PNCOMP 0.936 0.831 0.912
BINT 0.967 0.907 0.109 0.953
SEFF 0.956 0.878 0.222 0.384 0.937
PVUL 0.944 0.850 0.017 -0.030 -0.033 0.922
TSEV 0.937 0.833 -0.011 -0.060 0.056 -0.594 0.913
REFF 0.900 0.752 0.289 0.176 0.238 0.387 -0.391 0.867
SNORM 0.879 0.708 0.186 0.273 0.477 0.112 -0.040 0.190 0.842
PBC 0.879 0.711 0.188 0.354 0.912 -0.068 0.105 0.235 0.467 0.843
ATT 0.939 0.838 0.267 0.349 0.583 -0.031 0.087 0.241 0.664 0.578 0.915
SSEV 0.893 0.737 -0.432 -0.060 0.025 -0.147 0.238 -0.403 -0.221 0.036 -0.186 0.858
SPROB 0.886 0.722 0.338 0.012 -0.080 0.139 -0.033 0.331 0.207 -0.013 0.134 -0.662 0.850
PCOMP 0.913 0.780 -0.308 -0.142 -0.325 -0.059 0.211 -0.258 -0.225 -0.293 -0.189 0.193 -0.064 0.883
PBEN 0.869 0.690 0.515 0.199 0.299 0.071 -0.086 0.373 0.264 0.290 0.239 -0.389 0.377 -0.335 0.831
Workstation 
Locking CR AVE PNCOMP BINT SEFF PVUL TSEV REFF SNORM PBC ATT SSEV SPROB PCOMP PBEN
PNCOMP 0.921 0.795 0.892
BINT 0.977 0.934 -0.333 0.967
SEFF 0.951 0.867 0.208 -0.147 0.931
PVUL 0.861 0.676 -0.299 0.356 0.004 0.822
TSEV 0.952 0.869 0.372 -0.179 0.084 -0.688 0.932
REFF 0.873 0.698 0.431 -0.171 0.556 -0.256 0.390 0.836
SNORM 0.898 0.746 -0.340 0.593 -0.103 0.281 -0.236 -0.160 0.864
PBC 0.870 0.691 0.274 -0.231 0.956 -0.008 0.070 0.587 -0.087 0.832
ATT 0.901 0.753 0.348 -0.305 0.666 -0.250 0.268 0.652 -0.226 0.781 0.868
SSEV 0.916 0.786 -0.535 0.324 -0.026 0.446 -0.250 -0.271 0.366 -0.074 -0.223 0.886
SPROB 0.914 0.781 0.602 -0.204 0.109 -0.399 0.563 0.429 -0.336 0.080 0.264 -0.638 0.883
PCOMP 0.935 0.827 -0.240 0.537 -0.261 0.290 -0.146 -0.274 0.338 -0.342 -0.368 0.313 -0.174 0.910
PBEN 0.874 0.703 0.724 -0.283 0.325 -0.291 0.363 0.528 -0.281 0.350 0.501 -0.397 0.560 -0.300 0.838
Password Sharing CR AVE PNCOMP BINT SEFF PVUL TSEV REFF SNORM PBC ATT SSEV SPROB PCOMP PBEN
PNCOMP 0.929 0.813 0.902
BINT 0.985 0.957 -0.315 0.978
SEFF 0.968 0.911 0.237 -0.239 0.954
PVUL 0.941 0.843 -0.542 0.402 -0.266 0.918
TSEV 0.957 0.882 0.462 -0.251 0.172 -0.653 0.939
REFF 0.927 0.809 0.487 -0.276 0.484 -0.485 0.502 0.899
SNORM 0.875 0.701 -0.324 0.778 -0.201 0.346 -0.249 -0.300 0.837
PBC 0.882 0.714 0.301 -0.301 0.990 -0.305 0.259 0.555 -0.266 0.845
ATT 0.933 0.823 0.341 -0.471 0.624 -0.419 0.384 0.622 -0.448 0.702 0.907
SSEV 0.924 0.803 -0.496 0.156 -0.142 0.349 -0.297 -0.319 0.169 -0.155 -0.181 0.896
SPROB 0.939 0.836 0.467 -0.132 0.203 -0.374 0.570 0.406 -0.179 0.248 0.276 -0.516 0.914
PCOMP 0.939 0.838 -0.260 0.482 -0.417 0.294 -0.127 -0.279 0.460 -0.442 -0.361 0.135 -0.115 0.915
PBEN 0.871 0.698 0.656 -0.285 0.332 -0.391 0.354 0.550 -0.293 0.381 0.359 -0.386 0.446 -0.314 0.835
Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Perceived Vulnerability to Threat (PVUL), Perceived Threat Severity 
(TSEV), Response Efficacy (REFF), Subjective Norms (SNORM), Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC), Attitude (ATT), Perceived 
Sanction Severity (SSEV), Perceived Sanction Probability (SPROB), Perceived Cost of Compliance (PCOMP), Perceived Cost of non-
Compliance (PNCOMP) 
Note: Off diagonal numbers are interconstruct correlations; diagonal numbers are the square roots of AVE (average variance 
extracted).
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Table 8. CBSEM Model Fit Results for Study 2 
Model χ2 df p CFI RMSEA 
Theory of planned behavior  
Generic measure 144.411 48 0.013 0.959 0.095 
Workstation locking 117.513 48 0.028 0.971 0.082 
Password sharing 167.394 48 0.01 0.957 0.108 
Protection motivation theory  
Generic measure 110.992 80 0.416 0.991 0.042 
Workstation locking 134.088 80 0.362 0.983 0.055 
Password sharing 194.728 80 0.098 0.972 0.082 
Deterrence theory 
Generic measure 66.303 24 0.001 0.976 0.089 
Workstation locking 72.037 24 0.001 0.975 0.095 
Password sharing 35.013 24 0.438 0.995 0.046 
Rational choice theory 
Generic measure 190.032 83 0.090 0.965 0.076 
Workstation locking 187.334 83 0.016 0.961 0.082 
Password sharing 193.658 83 0.444 0.965 0.079 
 
While we found the R2 values in Study 1 to be 
relatively consistent across security actions, we found 
that the R2 values varied greatly according to security 
action and theoretical model in Study 2. Specifically, 
the R2 values in the TPB model were 14.9% for ISP 
compliance with the generic undefined security action 
measure, 39.4% for workstation locking, and 62.4% 
for password sharing. The R2 values in the RCT model 
were low for the generic measures (12.1%) and 
workstation locking (10.9%) but high for password 
sharing ISP compliance (72.3%). Typical workstations 
have an automatic locking feature after a specified 
period of inactivity, which might render a rational cost- 
benefit analysis much less relevant for that threat-
specific security action. Additionally, the R2 value on 
attitude for password sharing was over 90% but less 
than 10% for the generic undefined security action 
measures. If we had just used a generic undefined 
security action measure of ISP compliance, we might 
inaccurately conclude that costs and benefits have 
minimal impact on shaping an individual’s attitudes 
towards ISP compliance intentions due to the low R2 
value. Perceived costs and benefits do matter for ISP 
compliance, but perhaps only for certain threat-
specific security actions. As with Study 1, the R2 values 
 
18  The path coefficients for the PMT model for the 
workstation locking and password sharing threat-specific 
security actions were impacted (suppressed) by the large 
impact of perceived vulnerability on intentions. We 
conducted a post hoc analysis where we removed perceived 
vulnerability from the PMT structural model, which resulted 
in threat severity having a larger and significant impact on 
for DT were unsurprisingly low. The R2 values in the 
PMT model were reasonably consistent across threat-
specific security actions and the generic undefined 
security action measures. However, it is worth noting 
that the R2 values for the PMT conditions were roughly 
50% lower than the R2 values for the PMT conditions 
in Study 1. 
The path coefficient magnitude and significance 
associated with each theoretical model also varied 
considerably across the different threat-specific 
security actions and the generic undefined security 
action measures.18 In the RCT models, the perceived 
benefits and costs of compliance were significant for 
the threat-specific security actions but were not 
significant for the generic undefined security action 
measures. Interestingly, the perceived costs of 
noncompliance construct in the RCT models was 
significant when we used the generic undefined 
security action measures but not significant for either 
password sharing or workstation locking. Therefore, 
just using the generic undefined security action 
measures yielded vastly different results in the context 
of RCT. These differences were also evident with our 
PMT results. All three instances had different sets of 
intentions for the workstation locking threat. This post hoc 
analysis also revealed that self-efficacy had a larger and 
significant impact on intentions for the password sharing 
threat-specific security action. A similar phenomenon 
occurred in the TPB model due to the very strong relationship 
between subjective norms and behavioral intentions. 
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significant path coefficients. In the TPB, our data 
showed that subjective norms were a significant factor 
when measuring threat-specific security intentions for 
both password sharing and workstation locking but not 
significant when using the generic undefined security 
action measures. Again, the generic undefined security 
action measures would lead us to believe that 
subjective norms may not be an important factor in ISP 
compliance, but they do matter for password sharing 
and workstation locking. Additionally, as shown in 
Table 9 and Table 10, the influence of attitudes on 
behavioral intentions in the RCT models are 
significantly stronger for both threat-specific security 
actions compared to the generic undefined security 
action measure. Furthermore, there is something 
different influencing the attitudes of participants 
regarding password sharing compared to the other 
threat-specific security actions (and the generic 
undefined security action measure), but we would not 
have seen this relationship if we had relied upon 
generic undefined security action measures to drive 
our analysis and scientific inquiry.
Table 9. CBSEM Model Structural Path Results for Study 2 
Model Generic Measure Workstation Locking Password Sharing 
Theory of planned behavior 
R2 (BINT) 0.149 0.394 0.624 
SNORM → BINT 0.048(NS) 0.707*** 0.831*** 
ATT → BINT 0.248 (p=.097) 0.028(NS) 0.222(p=.10) 
PBC → BINT 0.208* 0.404(NS) 0.05(NS) 
Protection motivation theory 
R2 (BINT) 0.155 0.168 0.183 
TSEV → BINT 0.088(NS) 0.176(NS) 0.037(NS) 
PVUL → BINT 0.087(NS) 0.484*** 0.461*** 
REFF → BINT 0.079(NS) 0.035(NS) 0.034(NS) 
SEFF → BINT 0.365* 0.119(NS) -0.283(p=.10) 
Deterrence theory  
R2 (BINT) 0.01 0.105 0.03 
SPROB → BINT 0.044(NS) 0.003(NS) 0.084(NS) 
SSEV → BINT 0.086(NS) 0.439*** 0.156(NS) 
Rational choice theory  
R2 (BINT) 0.121 0.109 0.723 
R2 (ATT) 0.087 0.317 0.911 
PBEN → ATT 0.120(NS) 0.317*** 0.211* 
PCOMP → ATT -0.09(NS) -0.145*** -0.206*** 
PNCOMP → ATT -0.139* -0.041(NS) -0.100(NS) 
ATT → BINT 0.455*** 0.634*** 0.810*** 
Notes: For ease of visually differentiating significant and non-significant path relationships in the CBSEM results, 
we used NS to signify not significant. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
BINT: Behavioral Intent, ATT: Attitude, PBC: Perceived Behavioral Control, SPROB: Perceived Sanction 
Probability, SSEV: Sanction Severity, SEFF: Self-Efficacy, TSEV: Perceived Threat Severity, PVUL: Perceived 
Vulnerability, REFF: Response Efficacy, PBEN: Perceived Benefit from Compliance, PCOMP: Perceived Benefit 
from Complying, PNCOMP: Perceived Cost from Noncompliance, NS: Not Significant (p > 0.1).  
 
Generally Speaking, Context Matters 
 
1721 
Table 10. Study 2 Path Coefficient Differences 
Theory of planned behavior Deterrence theory 
SNORM → BINT   GEN WL SPROB → BINT   GEN WL 
  WL 0.659*     WL 0.041   
  PS 0.782* 0.127   PS 0.04 0.081 
ATT → BINT   GEN WL SSEV → BINT   GEN WL 
  WL 0.22*     WL 0.353*   
  PS 0.026 0.194*   PS 0.07 0.283* 
PBC → BINT   GEN WL         
  WL 0.196*           
  PS 0.158* 0.354*         
Protection motivation theory Rational choice theory 
TSEV → BINT   GEN WL PBEN → ATT   GEN WL 
  WL 0.088     WL 0.197*   
  PS 0.051 0.139*   PS 0.081 0.106 
PVUL → BINT   GEN WL PCOMP → ATT   GEN WL 
  WL 0.397*     WL 0.136   
  PS 0.374* 0.023   PS 0.197* 0.061 
REFF → BINT   GEN WL PNCOMP → ATT   GEN WL 
  WL 0.044     WL 0.098  
  PS 0.045 0.001   PS 0.039 0.059 
SEFF → BINT   GEN WL ATT → BINT   GEN WL 
  WL 0.246*     WL 0.179*   
  PS 0.082 0.164*   PS 0.355* 0.176 
Notes: 
BINT: Behavioral Intent, ATT: Attitude, PBC: Perceived Behavioral Control, SPROB: Perceived Sanctional Probability, SSEV: 
Sanction Severity, SEFF: Self-Efficacy, TSEV: Perceived Threat Severity, PVUL: Perceived Vulnerability, REFF: Response 
Efficacy, PBEN: Perceived Benefit from Compliance, PCOMP: Perceived Benefit from Complying, PNCOMP: Perceived Cost from 
Noncompliance, GEN: Generic measure, WL: Workstation locking, PS: Password sharing. 
* means passed the Wald chi-square significance test confirming a statistically significant difference for that model path between the 
two reference security threat conditions.  
Cell numbers indicate the difference between the coefficient values for the two corresponding constructs. 
 
6.3 Study 2 Limitations 
The primary weakness of our second study was the 
lack of required recurrent training and a much weaker 
security culture in the private university that we 
studied. The individuals covered by this university’s 
ISP were not required to be repeatedly trained and 
tested on the contents of the ISP. Training repetition 
helps create a security culture within an organization 
that positively impacts long-term compliance 
intentions (Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron, 2016). Although 
we tried to control for this by requiring our survey 
participants to read the policies related to workstation 
locking and password sharing (and by including the 
proper ISP actions in the actual scenario wording), it is 
possible that this was the first time that some of our 
research subjects had read their ISP. If participants 
were not knowledgeable about the contents of their 
ISP, then the generic undefined security action 
measures became even more problematic since the 
individuals were unaware of what is generally covered 
by their ISP. Therefore, the lack of ISP-related 
knowledge was more of a confounding variable in 
Study 2 than it was in Study 1. 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
The objective of ISP compliance research is (or at least 
should be) to discover the mechanisms, treatments, and 
behavioral antecedents that will maximize employees’ 
compliance behaviors (or intentions thereof) (Crossler 
et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2013; Siponen & Vance, 
2014). In other words, how can we encourage more 
employees to follow the rules and regulations outlined 
in their organizations’ ISP documents? Our literature 
review revealed that the vast majority of the prior ISP 
compliance research that has been published in our top 
journals has attempted to answer this question by 
developing universal or pseudo-universal models of 
ISP compliance that purportedly cover many or all of 
the policies contained in organizational ISPs. 
Contrarily, we have argued in our paper that 
constructing particular models of threat-specific 
security actions will be more useful at accomplishing 
this objective because particular models are grounded 
in a specific security action instead of an undefined or 
aggregated collection of different (somewhat arbitrary) 
security actions. Essentially, we are suggesting that we 
can maximize employee compliance one threat-
specific security action at a time, because compliance 
with each security action often requires different 
thought processes, time, diligence, knowledge, and 
effort to comply. 
There is significant behavioral variability in ISP- 
mandated actions (Siponen & Vance, 2014), so we (as 
a research community) have to think critically about 
the types of behaviors that a universal model of ISP 
compliance is actually modeling (Siponen & 
Baskerville, 2018). ISP-related behaviors range from 
simple actions such as running software updates when 
automatically prompted to do so to much more 
complicated actions such as preventing a superior from 
tailgating into a restricted area. From a measurement 
perspective, we assert that it is difficult for researchers 
to capture this behavioral variability in a single set of 
measures (whether they are focused on a single threat-
specific security action, multiple threat-specific 
security actions, or one generic measure related to an 
undefined security action). Our results suggest that it 
is problematic to make the following claims of 
generalization: (1) generalizing models measuring 
general compliance intentions to all threat-specific 
security compliance intentions, (2) generalizing threat-
specific models to other threat-specific security 
actions, and (3) generalizing threat-specific models to 
general compliance intentions. 
As reviewers and editors of academic papers, we 
should challenge our colleagues to better justify the 
types of measures (undefined security actions, 
behavioral items, scenario vignettes or qualitative) that 
are used along with the level of generalization that the 
authors are attempting to make with those measures. 
For example, simply citing a prior study as justification 
(which is the norm for ISP research) for using generic 
undefined security action measures is not a solid 
justification (by itself). Specifically concerning 
generic undefined security action measures, we should 
challenge our colleagues to clearly identify the 
following: (1) the types of behaviors that these generic 
undefined security action measures are capturing, (2) 
how these generic undefined security action measures 
are relevant for the advancement of the ISP compliance 
field, and (3) why these generic undefined security 
action measures are preferable to threat-specific 
security measures for their research objectives. 
Similarly, when reviewing papers that are aggregating 
scenario vignettes across different security actions, we 
should push and challenge the authors to clearly 
demonstrate why this type of aggregation is better for 
the advancement of ISP-related knowledge than 
analyzing the different scenarios separately. If we 
aggregate across multiple threats that all require 
different actions, then what are we conceptually 
capturing with this aggregation? Our empirical results 
show different path coefficient characteristics, 
explanatory power, and model fit metrics across ISP-
mandated threat-specific security actions, which 
suggests that this type of aggregation might be 
averaging or smoothing out the effects. Is this 
smoothed-out collection of ISP-mandated threat-
specific security actions the types of behaviors that we 
want organizations to promote among their 
employees? Reviewers and editors should push and 
challenge our colleagues to address these questions 
conceptually and empirically. 
Our literature review implies that our top journals have 
a strong preference to publish allegedly universal or 
pseudo-universal models of ISP compliance. The 
authors of these papers seemingly have to speculate 
that their threat-specific security action is widely 
generalizable to many or most threat-specific security 
actions contained in an organization’s ISP. As such, 
the authors routinely issue an obligatory apology 
statement as a result of their decision to investigate a 
particular threat-specific security action contained in 
the ISP. It is interesting how researchers classify their 
research context as a research limitation or weakness. 
We assert that the specific ISP-related problem that is 
being investigated is not a study limitation or 
weakness. A research limitation or weakness is, for 
instance, violating the assumptions of a statistical 
model or unjustifiably leading interviewees in a 
qualitative case study (Lee, 1991). Why should the 
authors apologize for investigating, say, the ISP-
related preventative or mitigating actions associated 
with ransomware? Ransomware is a timely and 
significant problem facing organizations. It is only 
perceived as a research limitation or weakness because 
researchers who want to increase their probability of 
getting a ransomware ISP compliance paper published 
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in one of our leading journals seemingly have to 
speculate that the ISP-mandated actions associated 
with ransomware are similar to many or most other 
policies contained in the ISP document. To do so, the 
authors must make very speculative claims of 
generalization regarding their ransomware empirical 
observations. For instance, the authors would have to 
claim that ransomware compliance is somehow 
representative of all, many, or most other policies 
contained in an organization’s ISP document. We posit 
that making this type of generalization is problematic 
given the wide variety of threat-specific security 
actions covered by typical ISPs. 
We argue that solving the problem of compliance with 
the ransomware policies and procedures in-depth has 
tremendous theoretical value even if the ransomware 
ISP-directed behaviors are completely unrelated to the 
other policies and procedures contained in the ISP 
document. Why should a paper be considered to be 
more publishable (in our top journals) if there are 
overlapping (generalizable) mechanisms, treatments, 
and behavioral antecedents for ransomware 
compliance and tailgating compliance? As ISP 
compliance scholars, we spend a significant amount of 
time and energy arguing about whether our research 
models are generalizable to other contexts. At the end 
of the day, however, it is almost pure speculation 
(Davison & Martinsons, 2016). Additionally, part of 
the scientific process is testing different models with 
different types of behaviors. In the ISP compliance 
space, however, our literature review implies that we 
are primarily interested in discovering the factors 
affecting all (or at least many) compliance behaviors 
while largely ignoring important contextual 
components related to scientific discovery. 
If our discipline were to switch its publication bias 
from universal to particular models of ISP compliance, 
we posit that this switch would open the door to a 
variety of meta-analyses that might be very 
meaningful. For instance, if there are a dozen or so 
models of phishing compliance all using different or 
similar theoretical perspectives, then we might be able 
to gain a very deep understanding of the factors 
influencing phishing ISP behaviors by performing a 
meta-analysis. We might also be able to compare and 
contrast the models that use the same theories to 
explain different ISP-mandated security actions in 
order to determine both similarities and differences 
across multiple types of security actions. We suggest 
that this approach to enhancing ISP knowledge would 
be richer than the generic undefined security action 
measures or the aggregation of different scenario 
vignettes that have been used in the prior literature. 
However, this approach can only work if our discipline 
publishes particular models in our top journals. If these 
particular models are being filtered out of our top 
journals because they are not universal enough to begin 
with, then this type of future research cannot be 
reasonably accomplished. 
Our paper is the first to examine differences between 
different types of ISP-directed threat-specific security 
actions and generic undefined security action measures 
of ISP compliance actions (or intentions thereof). 
Comparing and contrasting ISP compliance models 
across different threat-specific security actions and 
generic undefined security-action measures is 
necessary in order to support or refute the speculative 
claims of generalization that are routinely made in our 
top-level publications. Siponen and Baskerville (2018, 
p. 250) refer to this as a proverbial horse race between 
models using different theories, constructs, and 
relationships. Prior research has infrequently 
compared different models to see which theoretical 
perspective is best at solving a particular ISP-related 
behavioral problem. If the prior literature is correct in 
their speculative claims of empirical generalization, 
then we should have seen similar or more consistent 
effects (i.e., model fit, R2, and path coefficient 
characteristics) across the different theories and threat-
specific security actions even though the ISP-directed 
actions were different. However, our data revealed 
many significant differences across both of our 
empirical studies. For instance, perceived behavioral 
control is an important behavioral antecedent to ISP-
related security actions but only for certain threat-
specific security actions. Our empirical results suggest 
that attempting to generalize the effect of perceived 
behavioral control to all or most other ISP-directed 
security actions is potentially problematic. The type of 
ISP-related action will ultimately determine whether 
perceived behavioral control and other important 
variables impact ISP compliance actions (or intentions 
thereof). The threat-to-threat differences that we found 
in our data question whether a universal model of ISP 
compliance can be constructed empirically given the 
variety of security behaviors covered by typical ISPs. 
We investigated threat-specific security actions as the 
area of particularism that we proposed to be relevant to 
ISP-related behaviors. We make no claims that the 
threat-specific security action is the only particularism 
dimension that is relevant for ISP-related behaviors. 
We suggest that our theoretical and empirical insights 
could motivate future research related to other ISP-
related differences. For instance, future research might 
investigate cultural differences at the national or 
organizational levels, behavioral variability at the 
industry level, mitigating control differences (e.g., 
compliance with the use of anti-malware software 
versus compliance with the use of VPN software), or 
device differences (e.g., compliance with the policies 
related to locking a bring your own device such as a 
tablet or smartphone versus a company desktop or 
laptop). 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1724 
Additionally, future research might investigate 
phishing (or a different threat-specific security action) 
using the TPB or PMT in the context of a bank, which 
might be an interesting contextual boundary condition 
to either one of those theories. For example, bankers 
might have (or need) greater sensitivity to phishing 
scams due to the nature of their jobs. Banks may be 
subject to phishing attempts more than educators or 
construction office staff due to the added attention that 
banks get from cybercriminals. Banks control trillions 
of dollars in assets, so developing a banking-specific 
model of ISP phishing compliance would potentially 
be extremely impactful and a useful extension to the 
TPB, PMT, or an alternative theoretical perspective. 
We would also suggest that future research tackling 
this problem should not have to apologize for 
investigating bankers as their contextual extension 
(even if bankers are unique and not related to lawyers 
working in law firms or educators working at 
universities). 
We used two different organizations with vastly 
different information security cultures. Even though 
our results were similar across these two 
organizational settings, caution should still be taken 
when applying our results to other types of 
organizations without clearly understanding the 
demographic, industry, and cultural differences. 
However, the point of our study was not to conclude 
that every organization will have the same model fit 
statistics, coefficient path magnitudes, or significance 
levels across these threat-specific security actions but 
instead to conclude that specific ISP-directed security 
actions will have different behavioral antecedents. 
How those differences may play out in different 
settings is an open theoretical and empirical question. 
We are not suggesting that a bank or a hospital will be 
the same as our two organizations; rather, we are 
suggesting that research in each organizational context 
should be cautious when attempting to generalize the 
behavioral antecedents to and from different threat-
specific security actions as dictated by their 
organizations ISPs. 
From a theoretical perspective, we have argued that 
particular models of ISP compliance have more 
theoretical value because different security actions 
may have dissimilar behavioral antecedents. From a 
practical perspective, however, it is ultimately an 
empirical question as to whether security managers 
would prefer universal or particular models of ISP 
compliance. As ISP compliance researchers, it is our 
job to construct models that provide conceptual clarity 
to whatever we are investigating and to provide sound 
empirical evidence supporting those conceptually clear 
models. If we do an exemplary job with this, then the 
security managers can decide which types of models 
are best for their specific organizations. Instead of 
attempting to speculate as to what security managers 
may prefer, we as researchers should provide all types 
of empirical evidence and conceptual models 
concerning ISP compliance and give the practitioners 
the autonomy to decide which models are most 
relevant to their organizations.  
In our paper, we do not address the why question. 
Based on the design and implementation of our two 
studies, we speculate that the differences in our 
empirical results are due to the different ISP-mandated 
requirements surrounding our chosen threat-specific 
security actions. From our analysis of the specific ISP 
policies of our chosen threat-specific security actions 
across the two organizations that we studied, we 
noticed differences in terms of time, difficulty, 
diligence, knowledge, social interactivity and effort to 
comply with the specific policies. Future research 
should build off of our conceptual and empirical 
analyses to investigate why we see different results 
between different threat-specific security actions and 
the generic undefined security action measures. Our 
research objective was to foster debate and discussion 
by conceptually pointing out the challenges associated 
with universal models of ISP compliance and 
empirically evaluating measurement and 
generalization issues with ISP compliance actions (or 
intentions thereof). Our paper will have been 
successful if it helps the research community reflect 
upon on the types of papers that are getting published 
in our top journals, debate whether these journals are 
hindering or facilitating the advancement of 
knowledge in the ISP compliance space due to their 
publication preferences, and think critically about the 
types of measures and the claims of generalization that 
we as ISP compliance researchers are making in the 
journal articles that are driving the direction of the 
field. 
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Shoss (2014) 
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Guo, Yuan, Archer, & 
Connelly (2011) 
 x    x  
8 
Hedström, Kolkowska, 
Karlsson, & Allen 
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McBride, & Carter 
(2016) 
  x  x   
12 
Johnston, Warkentin & 
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22 Straub (1990) x    x   
23 
Vance, Lowry, & 
Eggett (2013) 
  x    x 
24 
Vance, Lowry, & 
Eggett (2015) 
  x    x 
25 
Willison, Warkentin & 
Johnston (2018) 
  xf  x   
a Generic measures (i.e., “I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP”) relate to an undefined security action, threat-specific measures 
(i.e., “I intend to comply with the tailgating requirements in the ISP”), scenario vignettes (i.e., present the research subjects with a hypothetical 
scenario related to a threat-specific security action), or qualitative measures (i.e., case study of a particular workplace or setting). 
b The scenarios in this study varied certainty of control, punishment, and reward. However, the behaviors measured general compliance of 
employees with policies regarding passwords, email use, and acceptable of computing technologies.  
c This paper was particular in terms of industry (health care) but universal in terms of the types of ISP-related behaviors. 
d The stated purpose of this study was to help managers improve their employees’ intentions to engage in secure behavior. However, the behavior 
examined was the voluntary use of a password manager application. Although the term ISP compliance was not directly used in this paper, the 
focus on managers implies some policy directed behaviors. 
e Although the title of this paper might suggest that this paper should be classified as universal, the authors outline certain constructs that might be 
generic (universal) and others that may be specific to the particular information security action (pg. 21-23). Therefore, we have their unified model 
classified as pseudo-universal instead of universal in our classification system. 
f This study used multiple scenarios to measure the effect of varying levels of organizational justice, perceived sanction severity and certainty, 
and neutralization. However, they used a single security threat (password theft) in all their scenarios. 
 
Table A2. Quotes about Generalization and Limitations 
Citation Quotes or comments 
Boss, Kirsch, 
Angermeier, Shingler & 
Boss (2009) 
“In this study, precaution taking is defined as the degree to which individuals perceive they 
take measures to secure their computers and deal with information security in accordance 
with prescribed corporate security policies and procedures as well as through individual, 
proactive actions. Thus, in addition to following prescribed security policies and procedures, 
individuals should be generally aware of security threats. This general awareness can be 
enhanced through management formation and communication of formal information security 
policies (Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998).” p. 155 
“Finally, this study used individuals that are employed in the health-care industry and, given 
the nature of the industry and the implementation of federal health privacy laws; it could be 
argued that this group is more accepting of formal controls than those in a different setting, 
therefore affecting the generalizability of the study.” p. 161 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat (2010) 
“For the sake of the generalizability of our results, we opted out of objective measurements 
of the ISP and actual compliance behavior. Case studies about ISP compliance that focus on 
employees from one or a few organizations would also be useful future research since such 
case studies could provide an opportunity to measure employees’ ISA and their actual 
compliance with the requirements of their organizations’ ISP objectively.” p. 543 
“Another limitation of the study may be that it captures compliance at a high level of 
abstraction. Use of scenarios can help reveal the differences in an employee’s intentions to 
comply with specific rules and regulations, since scenarios can provide detailed explanations 
about specific policies (i.e., password policy, Internet use policy, remote access policy, and 
so on). Hence, future research should investigate employee compliance behavior in regard to 
these specific policies by providing detailed scenarios.” p. 543 
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Chen, Ramamurthy, & 
Wen, (2012) 
“We examined fairly extensively information security policy practices prevailing in industry 
[35] and surveyed the existing literature to ensure that our scenarios were realistic, familiar, 
and succinct, and that our corresponding findings were generalizable based on the 
scenarios.” p. 170 
“Since no ‘optimal’ number of scenarios has been suggested in the literature [76], we pilot 
tested the number of scenarios used in the study to ensure its adequacy.” p. 170 
“Care also needs to be taken when generalizing our findings to other companies in the 
financial industry.” p. 171 
D’Arcy , Herath , & 
Shoss (2014) 
“Second, the phenomenon of ISP violations in this study is limited to more common, less 
extreme incidents that require minimal technical sophistication. Although we intentionally 
chose this route based on our literature review and feedback from IS security practitioners, a 
trade-off is that our findings may not generalize to more extreme, potentially disastrous 
security incidents. However, as research suggests a link between minor policy violations and 
more serious computer abuses [69], our findings have potential implications beyond the five 
types of ISP violations included here.” p. 307-308 
D’Arcy, Hovav, & 
Galletta, (2009) 
“Because the goal of this study was to examine generalized patterns of IS misuse rather than 
specific behaviors depicted in each scenario, we created composite measures … by summing 
the responses to these items across the four misuse scenarios. Therefore, our general 
measures ... general indices of these variables. Silberman (1976) provides a theoretical 
rationale for using composite measures by suggesting that we may be able to predict 
generalized patterns of deviant behavior better than specific deviant events.” p. 86 
“Third, the measurement of IS misuse in this study is limited to the specific hypothetical 
scenarios chosen. Although the scenarios cover a wide range of security issues, they do not 
include every type of IS misuse. Future research should test the explanatory power of our 
model on a larger number of IS misuse behaviors. Additional analysis by scenario (e.g., 
Leonard and Cronan 2001, Leonard et al. 2004) could also test for differences in the impact 
of the security countermeasures on individual IS misuse behaviors.” p. 94 
Foth (2016) None. 
Guo, Yuan, Archer, & 
Connelly (2011) 
“Second, this study used four specific security scenarios to solicit participant responses. 
Although this scenario-based method is commonly accepted in the literature, a limitation of 
this method is that the scenarios do not include every possible type of security violation. 
Future research should include more types of NMSVs to further test the proposed model. 
Third, the model focuses on NMSV intention as the ultimate independent variable. Although 
this practice is not uncommon in the IS literature, future research should try to measure 
actual security violations in a field setting to improve the model’s external validity and 
generalizability. Finally, in the current study we limited our scope to NMSVs, which is one 
of the possible ways of how users deal with IS security issues at work. Future research 
should investigate how NMSVs relate to other types of security behavior. One particular 
issue is the investigation of the similarity and differences between NMSVs and malicious 
violations. For example, do they share any common antecedents? Can the two types of 
violations be explained from the same theoretical perspective?” p. 227 
Hedström, Kolkowska, 
Karlsson, & Allen (2011) 
“We use a qualitative case study (Benbasat et al., 1987; Myers, 2009) in order to understand 
the rationalities drawn upon by health care professionals in their information security 
practice.” p. 376 
“Other limitations concern the use of the model—which has been evaluated in one 
organization. This model was further developed in a Swedish context, and although we 
believe that the model as such is possible to transfer to other national settings, the use and 
results of the model, will of course depend on the specific culturally context where it is 
used.” p. 383  
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Herath & Rao (2009) None. 




McBride, & Carter 
(2016) 
“Our study integrates situational and dispositional factors into a comprehensive model of 
information security policy violation intentions.” p. 245 
“In addition, we only assessed a single type of information security policy violation. Non-
compliance with information security policies by failing to encrypt data removed from the 
workplace is only one of many possible violation behaviors (Guo, 2013; Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013). To some extent, the choice of one behavior limits the generalizability of 
the findings to other security misbehaviors. However, given the large number of 
manipulations included in the study, adding multiple violations was not feasible.” p. 245 
Johnston, Warkentin, & 
Siponen (2015) 
None. 
Kolkowska, Karlsson & 
Hedström (2017) 
“Although our study indicates the usefulness of the VBC method, we do not claim that our 
findings are valid beyond the cases investigated. Indeed, some researchers have argued for 
the use of a nomothetic approach, because case studies are seen to be too context-specific to 
offer the possibility of generalisation (Benbasat et al., 1987). However, in order to evaluate 
the VBC method’s usefulness we needed to apply the method in real settings, similar to 
those in which it will be applied in future. Here, case studies provide such settings (Yin, 
1994), making case study-based research a relevant choice when combined with DSR.” 
Section 3 para 2. 
“Employees’ lack of compliance with information security policies is a perennial problem 
for many organisations. Currently, information security managers lack an ISAM to analyse 
the different rationalities that exist in relation to information security.” Section 6, para 1. 
Li, Sarathy, Zhang, & 
Luo (2014) 
“Another limitation of our study is that we only examined internet abuses in general without 
differentiating specific types of internet abuses such as online shopping and cyberstalking in 
the workplace. The model may not be extendable to severe cybercrimes.” p. 17 
Lowry & Moody (2015) 
“Finally, for exploratory purposes, we summarised the means for reactance according to ISP 
topic, which demonstrates that some ISPs naturally create more reactance than others, even 
when the underlying controls are the same (Table 7). Future research should identify the 
factors that distinguish ISP target behaviours cherished by users as highly personal freedoms 
from behaviours not similarly valued.” p.453 
Lowry, Posey, Bennett, 
& Roberts (2015) 
“Likewise, we were unable to ensure that all our respondents had experienced similar 
organisational disincentives within similar periods. Rather, our findings represent the 
expressions of individuals from various organisational environments and internal security 
cultures. This fact, however, gives our study greater generalisability because of the broad 
nature of the sample and the respondents’ organisational experiences. However, with regard 
to the links between specific disincentives and behaviours, longitudinal or experimental 
research would be illuminating.” p. 218 
Menard, Bott & Crossler 
(2017) 
“Several secure behaviors have been analyzed using security appeals, but our study featured 
just one recommended behavior: the installation and use of a password manager, which was 
selected due to its current low adoption rate. While our findings are insightful for PMT 
adaptations and overall behavioral InfoSec research, retesting our appeals using a variety of 
other behaviors, such as performing data backups or using antivirus software, may highlight 
interesting differences. Researchers may elect to study just one behavior or craft several 
different appeals focusing on single specific behaviors.” p. 1225 
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Moody, Siponen & 
Pahnila (2018) 
“We explained the non-significance of social factors or subjective norms due to the types of 
scenarios (types of these insecure acts) we had. We maintain that different results could be 
obtained by scenarios that examine different types of ISS behavior. For example, our 
scenarios, such as sharing passwords or insecure USB practices, may not be visible socially, 
nor are they widely socially unacceptable in a work environment (Siponen et al. 2010).” p. 
306 
“Our scenarios contained three types of ISS policy violations; hence, the applicability of the 
UMICPS beyond these three types of violations is not known, as discussed in the previous 
subsection.” p. 307  
Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, 
Vartiainen, & Vance 
(2009) 
“Our study used a case wherein a nurse pondered whether he should share his password with 
co-workers and, again, care should be taken in generalizing these findings to other situations. 
Another limitation of our study is its use of a single scenario. In studying hypothetical moral 
reasoning, one finds that the use of at least three scenarios is recommended (Rest, 1979; 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). However, deVries & Walker (1986) based their scoring of moral 
judgment on a single case. Therefore, while the use of three scenarios is common, previous 
research has also utilized just one scenario.” p. 136 
Posey, Roberts, & Lowry 
(2015) 
Uses Posey et al. (2013) to justify universal PMB measurements. Includes numerous past 
PMBs in the analyses. 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
“To ensure the generalizability of our findings across different kinds of IS security policy 
violations, we designed three different scenarios describing common and important policy 
violations in coordination with 54 information security professionals” p. 492 
Straub (1990) None. 
Vance, Lowry, & Eggett 
(2013) 
None. Conclusions focused on access policy violations and did not generalize beyond this 
security threat context. 
Vance, Lowry, & Eggett 
(2015) 
None. Conclusions focused on access policy violations and did not generalize beyond this 
security-threat context. 









Table B1. Study 1 ISP-Mandated Requirements 
Security threat DoD security policy requirements (Study 1) 
Phishing 
Assume all unsolicited information requests are phishing attempts 
Do not access the web by selecting links in emails or pop-up messages 
Delete any suspicious email 
View all email in the plain text 
Report emails requesting personal information to your security POC 
Use caution when visiting sites with expired certificates 
Report trusted sites with expired certificates 
Never reveal any personal information in an email 
Look for digital signatures  
Contact sender by other means before opening a doubtful attachment or link 
Never give out organizational, personal, or financial information to anyone by email 
Tailgating 
Use ONLY (emphasis included) your own security badge or key code 
Never grant access for someone else 
Maintain possession of your security badge at all times 
Challenge people without proper badges 
Be wary when people with visitor’s badges ask about other people’s office locations 
Report suspicious activity 
Removable Flash Media 
Use of removable flash media is forbidden except in case of command-directed and 
documented mission essential tasks per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
6510.01F. If approved, the following conditions must be met: 
Craft, promulgate, and implement risk management policies concerning the use of removable 
media. 
Restrict use to removable media that are USG-owned and have been purchased or acquired 
from authorized and trusted sources. 
Encrypt data on removable media using, at a minimum, the Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. 
Verify that the media contain only the minimum files that are necessary, and that the files are 
authenticated and scanned so that they are free of malicious software.  
Limit use of removable media to authorized personnel with appropriate training. 
Implement a program to track, account for, and safeguard all acquired removable media, as 
well as to track and audit all data transfers. 
Conduct both scheduled and random inspections to ensure compliance with 
department/agency-promulgated guidance regarding the use of removable media. 
Implement system-level software restriction rules in order to significantly reduce the potential 
for malicious code execution by removable media. 
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Construct Definition and item source(s) Survey question / Measurement item 
Behavioral intent 
(BINT) 
Self-reported intention to perform a 
security-related behavior. Items 
adapted from Ajzen (1991), Bulgurcu 
et al. (2010). 
I intend to comply with the ______________ requirements 
of the ISP of my organization in the future. 
I intend to protect information and technology resources 
according to the _____________ requirements of the ISP 
of my organization in the future. 
I intend to carry out my _____________ responsibilities 
prescribed in the ISP of my organization when I use 
information and technology in the future. 
Subjective norms 
(SNORM) 
The perceived social pressure to 
engage or not to engage in a security-
related behavior. Items adapted from 
Taylor and Todd (1995), Herath and 
Rao (2009). 
My peers/colleagues think that I should comply with the 
_____________ requirements of the ISP. 
My executives think that I should comply with the 
_______________ requirements of the ISP. 
My subordinates (or those junior to me) think that I should 
comply with the ___________ requirements of the ISP. 
Attitude (ATT) 
The self-reported degree to which 
performance of a security behavior is 
positively or negatively valued. Items 
adapted from Ajzen (1991); Herath and 
Rao (2009). 
Adopting ISP-related security technologies and practices is 
important for protecting against _________ threats. 
Adopting ISP-related security technologies and practices is 
beneficial for protecting against _________ threats. 
Adopting ISP-related security technologies and practices is 
helpful for protecting against _________ threats. 
Perceived behavioral 
control (PBC) 
One’s perceived ability to perform a 
given behavior in the presence of 
factors that may facilitate or impede 
performing the behavior. Items adapted 
from Taylor & Todd (1995). 
I would be able to follow the ISP for ___________ threats. 
Following the ISP for _________ threats is entirely within 
my control. 
I have the resources and knowledge and ability to follow 
the ISP for _______ threats. 
Self-efficacy (SEFF) 
One’s perceived ability to successfully 
complete a security-related behavior. 
Items adapted from Bandura (1991); 
Herath & Rao (2009).  
I have the necessary skills to fulfill the _____________ 
requirements of the ISP. 
I have the necessary knowledge to fulfill the 
_______________ requirements of the ISP. 
I have the necessary competencies to fulfill the 
________________ requirements of the ISP. 
Response efficacy 
(REFF) 
The extent one believes a 
recommended security response 
effectively deters or mitigates a threat. 
Items adapted from Rippetoe & Rogers 
(1987), Milne et al. (2000), Workman 
et al. (2008). 
Efforts to keep my organization's information resources 
safe from _________________ threats are: 
The effectiveness of available measures to protect my 
organization's information resources from 
________________ threats is: 
The preventative measures available to me to comply with 
the ___________________ requirements of the ISP are: 
Perceived vulnerability 
(PVUL) 
One’s belief in how susceptible they 
feel to a specified security threat. Items 
adapted from Champion (1984), Ng et 
al. (2009). 
The chances of experiencing a/an _______________ threat 
at work is: 
There is a good possibility that I will encounter a/an 
_____________ threat to my organization: 
I am likely to encounter a/an _________________ threat 
to my organization: 
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Perceived threat severity 
(TSEV) 
One’s perception of how serious a 
security threat would be to themselves. 
Items adapted from Ng et al. (2009). 
Having my organization's information resources accessed 
by unauthorized parties because of ________________ 
threats is: 
Having someone successfully attack and damage my 
organization's information resources because of a/an 
______________ threat is: 
Attacks on my organization's information resources due to 
__________________ violations of the ISP are: 
Perceived sanction 
severity (SSEV) 
One’s perception of how serious a 
penalty they would incur if they did 
not behave in accordance with formal 
security requirements. Items adapted 
from Herath & Rao (2009). 
My organization disciplines employees who fail to follow 
the _____________ requirements of ISP. 
My organization terminates employees who repeatedly fail 
to follow the ______________ requirements of the ISP. 
If I were caught violating the ______________ 
requirements of the ISP, I would be severely punished. 
Perceived sanction 
probability (SPROB) 
The perceived chance that one would 
get caught and punished for violating a 
required security behavior. Items 
adapted from Herath & Rao (2009). 
Employees that fail to follow the __________________ 
requirements of the ISP would be caught, eventually. 
The likelihood the organization would discover that an 
employee failed to follow the ________________ 
requirements of the ISP is: 
Perceived cost of 
compliance (PCOMP) 
An estimate of the resources required 
and/or negative effects that result from 
complying with a required security 
behavior. Items adapted from Bulgurcu 
et al. (2010). 
Complying with the ___________ requirements of the ISP 
is time consuming for me. 
Complying with the ___________ requirements of the ISP 
is time burdensome for me. 
Complying with the ___________ requirements of the ISP 
is time costly for me. 
Perceived benefit of 
compliance (PBEN) 
An estimate of the personal rewards 
received from complying with the 
required security behavior. Items 
adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010). 
My compliance with the ____________ requirements of 
the ISP would be favorable to me. 
My compliance with the ____________ requirements of 
the ISP would result in benefits to me. 
My compliance with the ____________ requirements of 
the ISP would create advantages for me. 
Perceived cost of 
noncompliance 
(PNCOMP) 
An estimate of the negative effects that 
result from failing to comply with the 
required security actions. Items 
adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010). 
My noncompliance with the ___________ requirements of 
the ISP would be harmful to me. 
My noncompliance with the ___________ requirements of 
the ISP would impact me negatively. 
My noncompliance with the ___________ requirements of 
the ISP would create disadvantages for me. 
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Table B3. Study 1 Factor Loadings 
Construct Item Generic measure Flash media Phishing Tailgating 
   
Factor 
load 
Mean Std dev 
Factor 
load 
Mean Std dev 
Factor 
load 
Mean Std dev 
Factor 
load 




BINT1 0.95 6.66 0.48 0.97 6.67 0.58 0.92 6.74 0.45 0.95 6.57 0.65 
BINT2 0.97 6.66 0.48 0.98 6.69 0.56 0.98 6.73 0.48 0.94 6.60 0.63 




SN1 0.89 6.42 0.73 0.95 6.35 0.89 0.90 6.49 0.70 0.92 6.33 0.87 
SN2 0.67 6.66 0.56 0.61 6.66 0.64 0.71 6.68 0.54 0.65 6.59 0.66 
SN3 0.71 6.29 0.84 0.83 6.21 1.00 0.75 6.33 0.84 0.83 6.15 1.04 
Attitude 
(ATT) 
ATT1 0.94 6.60 0.50 0.96 6.49 0.70 0.90 6.57 0.57 0.80 6.53 0.68 
ATT2 0.94 6.61 0.51 0.94 6.51 0.71 0.97 6.56 0.60 0.91 6.52 0.68 





PBC1 0.85 6.39 0.66 0.88 6.56 0.60 0.82 6.49 0.64 0.85 6.51 0.66 
PBC2 0.86 6.30 0.84 0.76 6.44 0.84 0.81 6.21 0.98 0.81 6.36 0.93 
PBC3 0.85 6.34 0.73 0.86 6.47 0.73 0.88 6.31 0.81 0.84 6.42 0.81 
Self-efficacy 
(SEFF) 
SE1 0.94 6.52 0.58 0.96 6.58 0.59 0.96 6.49 0.70 0.93 6.54 0.67 
SE2 0.95 6.47 0.59 0.95 6.58 0.57 0.98 6.48 0.67 0.95 6.53 0.62 




RE1 0.82 5.74 0.89 0.87 5.65 0.99 0.82 5.65 0.99 0.93 5.39 1.25 
RE2 0.92 5.76 0.81 0.95 5.67 0.93 0.93 5.67 0.93 0.95 5.41 1.21 




PVUL1 0.83 4.42 1.66 0.71 4.75 1.65 0.82 4.75 1.65 0.81 4.24 1.67 
PVUL2 0.97 4.67 1.60 0.98 4.86 1.61 0.95 4.86 1.61 0.97 4.39 1.62 





TSEV1 0.95 6.00 1.07 0.91 6.07 1.05 0.95 6.07 1.05 0.90 5.79 1.21 
TSEV2 0.90 6.23 0.99 0.91 6.25 0.96 0.90 6.25 0.96 0.93 6.03 1.22 





SSEV1 0.71 5.35 1.36 0.74 5.54 1.31 0.77 5.14 1.51 0.82 5.04 1.62 
SSEV2 0.74 4.42 1.50 0.64 4.43 1.50 0.75 4.30 1.44 0.76 4.22 1.53 





SP1 0.72 5.44 1.22 0.63 5.61 1.20 0.72 5.31 1.30 0.78 5.12 1.46 





PC1 0.81 3.97 1.76 0.87 3.90 1.94 0.86 3.27 1.72 0.90 3.34 1.73 
PC2 0.99 3.46 1.71 0.92 3.75 1.91 0.99 2.98 1.60 0.97 3.08 1.60 





PB1 0.65 5.86 1.10 0.75 5.64 1.35 0.67 5.92 1.10 0.72 5.77 1.15 
PB2 0.85 5.45 1.27 0.88 5.20 1.48 0.86 5.49 1.27 0.87 5.36 1.32 





PNC1 0.71 5.69 1.39 0.71 5.73 1.34 0.69 5.73 1.41 0.81 5.58 1.39 
PNC2 0.81 5.83 1.25 0.82 5.77 1.34 0.82 5.87 1.24 0.87 5.64 1.43 
PNC3 0.70 5.42 1.60 0.67 5.33 1.65 0.71 5.45 1.61 0.68 5.30 1.63 
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Table B4. Study 2 ISP-Mandated Requirements 
Security threat University-specific security policy requirements (Study 2) 
Password sharing 
Access to computers, software applications, and electronic information is 
frequently controlled through user identifiers and passwords. Users are responsible 
for creating and protecting passwords that grant them access to resources. Because 
shared passwords and identifiers present a major security risk, user identifiers and 
passwords must never be shared. Passwords that provide access to university 
resources must not be stored on personal computers and must not be displayed on 
sticky notes or scraps of paper sitting by computers. 
Workstation lock 
Users shall log off from applications, computers, and networks when finished. If 
computers are located in secure offices or laboratories, Users shall not leave 
unattended personal computers with open sessions without locking office doors, 
locking the computer, or providing similar protection. If computers are located in 
the open or in a shared computer lab, users shall complete their session and log off 
fully. The use of boot or other start-up passwords is recommended in environments 
where unauthorized persons may have physical access to computers. Shutting off 
computer monitors when not in use can also discourage such persons from 
attempting to use computers for snooping and other unauthorized activity (while 
also conserving energy). Many monitors have an automatic shut-down feature that 
does this. Reactivating the monitor to use the computer must require a password, 
the same way a screensaver would. 
 
Table B5. Study 2 Scenarios 
Security threat Employeea Studenta 
Workstation 
locking/logoutb 
Jordan works in the front office of a popular degree 
program offered at the university. His duties require 
frequent interaction with faculty, staff, students, and 
outside clients both at and away from his desk. Jordan 
is aware of the university's policy that employees must 
log out of or lock their computer workstation when not 
using it. When Jordan knows or believes he is going to 
be away from his desk for an extended period of time 
(one hour or longer), he locks his computer. However, 
based upon his typical schedule of frequent departures 
to and from his desk, Jordan mostly keeps his user 
account logged in to save him time in performing his 
normal duties. 
Jordan is studying in one of the open computer labs on 
campus. He’ll be there for most of the day working on 
assignments for a couple of different classes and 
preparing for an exam. Generally, he spends most of 
his time in the computer room when he studies, but he 
takes lots of breaks to go to the restroom, eat a snack or 
drink, or talk to his friends. Jordan is aware of the 
university’s policy that students must log out of or lock 
their computer workstation when not using it. When 
Jordan knows or believes he is going to be away from 
his desk for an extended period of time, he locks or logs 
out of the computer. However, since he won't usually 
be too far from the computer room, Jordan mostly 
keeps his user account logged in to save him time when 
he does need to use the computer. 
Password  
sharingb 
Casey splits her time working in the offices of two 
different degree programs offered at the university. In 
one of the offices, she is responsible for tracking the 
current status of research grant funding allocations for 
the entire department; this information is accessed 
using a special program that is only loaded on her office 
computer hard drive. Casey is aware of the university’s 
policy that each computer workstation must be 
password protected and that passwords are not to be 
shared. However, since Casey moves between job 
locations regularly, she shared the password to her 
office computer with several co-workers so that they 
can get the information they need when they need it. 
Casey expects that sharing her password will save her 
co-workers a lot of time and effort since they won’t 
have to wait for her to get back to the office. 
Casey is a college junior that is active in several student 
groups and is an officer in her sorority. Because she has 
a work study that allows her to print anything she needs 
related to her schoolwork, she never uses any of her 
1000 free pages of printing each semester. Casey is 
aware of the university’s policy that individual account 
user id's and passwords are not to be shared. However, 
because many of her sorority sisters and friends have 
run out of their print quota, she provides her user ID 
and password to those that need it so that they can print 
from her personal account. 
a Study 2 participants who identified themselves as employees were shown the employee-specific scenarios while all others were shown the 
student-specific scenarios 
b We used Moody et al. (2018) and Siponen and Vance (2010) as our guides to construct these two scenarios, but we did adapt these scenarios to 
fit our organizational context. 




Table B6. Study 2 Survey Measurement Items 
Construct Survey Question/Measurement Item 
Behavioral intent (BINT) 
It is likely that I would probably do what Jordan did in the described scenario. 
I would act in the same way as Jordan did if I were in the same situation. 
If I experienced similar circumstances as Jordan, I would probably operate in a similar manner. 
Subjective norms (SNORM) 
My peers/colleagues think that I should do what Jordan did.  
My supervisors/managers think that I should do what Jordan did.  
My subordinates/juniors (or those who look up to me) think that I should do what Jordan did.  
Attitude (ATT) 
It is important for Jordan to follow the TU workstation lock/logout policy in order to protect the 
organization against security threats.  
It would be beneficial for Jordan to follow the TU workstation lock/logout policy in order to 
protect the organization against security threats.  
In order to protect the organization against security threats, it would be helpful for Jordan to 
following the TU workstation lock/logout policy.  
Perceived behavioral control 
(PBC) 
I would be able to follow TU's workstation lock/logout policy.  
Personally following the workstation lock/logout policy is entirely within my control.  
I have the resources and knowledge and ability to follow the workstation lock/logout policy. 
Self-efficacy (SEFF) 
I have the necessary skills to fulfill the workstation lock/logout policy requirements. 
I have the necessary knowledge to fulfill the workstation lock/logout policy workstation 
lock/logout policy requirements. 
I have the necessary competencies to fulfill workstation lock/logout policy requirements.  
Response efficacy (REFF) 
Doing the opposite of what Jordan did would make my organization's information resources 
safer.  
Following the workstation lock/logout policy is effective at protecting my organization's 
information resources from security threats related to unauthorized access:  
The preventative measures described in the workstation lock/logout policy are:  
Perceived vulnerability 
(PVUL) 
The chances of experiencing a security threat doing what Jordan did is:  
The possibility that I will encounter an information security threat to my organization by doing 
what Jordan did is:  
Encountering an information security threat related to unauthorized computer access at my 
organization is:  
Perceived threat severity 
(TSEV) 
Having my organization's information resources accessed by unauthorized parties because of 
Jordan's failure to follow the workstation lock/logout policy is:  
Having someone successfully attack and damage my organization's information resources 
because Jordan's failure to follow the workstation lock/logout policy is:  
Attacks on my organization's information resources because of Jordan's failure to follow the 
workstation lock/logout policy are:  
Perceived sanction severity 
(SSEV) 
My organization will discipline employees, like Jordan, who fail to follow the workstation 
lock/logout requirements of ISP.  
My organization will terminate employees who repeatedly fail to follow the workstation 
lock/logout requirements of the ISP.  
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Table B6. Study 2 Survey Measurement Items 
If I were caught doing what Jordan did, I would be severely punished.  
Perceived sanction 
probability (SPROB) 
My organization will discipline employees, like Jordan, who fail to follow the workstation 
lock/logout requirements of the ISP.  
My organization will terminate employees who repeatedly fail to follow the workstation 
lock/logout requirements of the ISP.  
If I were caught doing what Jordan did, I would be severely punished.  
Perceived cost of compliance 
(PCOMP) 
Complying with the workstation lock/logout policy is time consuming. 
Complying with the workstation lock/logout policy is burdensome.  
Complying with the workstation lock/logout policy is inconvenient. 
Perceived benefit of 
compliance (PBEN) 
Doing the opposite of Jordan (i.e., complying with the workstation lock/lockout policy) would be 
favorable to me. 
My compliance with the workstation lock/logout policy would result in benefits to me. 
My compliance with the workstation lock/logout policy would create advantages for me. 
Perceived cost of 
noncompliance (PNCOMP) 
Violating the workstation lock/lockout like Jordan did would be harmful to me. 
Behaving like Jordan and violating the workstation lock/lockout policy would impact me 
negatively. 
My noncompliance with the workstation lock/logout policy would create disadvantages for me. 
Notes: Construct definitions and sources for Study 2 were the same as in Study 1 (shown in Table B1) with the following comments and exceptions: 
1) The generic measures were the same for both Study 1 & Study 2. 
2) Scenario-focused items used to measure workstation locking/logout and password sharing compliance were modified using Moody et 
al. (2018) and Siponen & Vance (2010) as a guide. 
3) Latent construct items were measured on a 7-point Likert scales (both positive and negative). Study 1 also used both negative and 
positive scales but Study 2 incorporated more negatively worded items than Study 1. 
4) The name “Jordan” and threat-specific security action “workstation lock/logout” is replaced with “Casey” and “password sharing” for 
all items related to the password-sharing scenario. 




Table B7. Study 2 Factor Loadings 
Construct Item Generic measure Workstation locking Password sharing 
   
Factor 
load 
Mean Std dev 
Factor 
load 
Mean Std dev 
Factor 
load 
Mean Std dev 
Behavioral intent 
(BINT) 
BINT1 0.92 6.25 1.33 0.96 4.02 1.88 0.97 2.88 1.86 
BINT2 0.97 6.33 1.25 0.98 3.94 1.88 0.98 2.86 1.84 
BINT3 0.96 6.33 1.19 0.96 4.00 1.88 0.98 2.87 1.86 
Subjective norms 
(SNORM) 
SN1 0.88 5.74 1.21 0.91 3.89 1.62 0.88 3.35 1.81 
SN2 0.77 6.16 1.18 0.77 3.16 1.59 0.71 2.51 1.59 
SN3 0.88 5.75 1.28 0.91 3.74 1.61 0.91 3.17 1.70 
Attitude (ATT) 
ATT1 0.92 6.26 1.10 0.75 5.63 1.21 0.88 5.80 1.21 
ATT2 0.94 6.22 1.10 0.89 5.73 1.08 0.91 5.72 1.21 




PBC1 0.74 5.99 1.22 0.81 5.92 1.11 0.79 6.03 1.10 
PBC2 0.83 5.77 1.33 0.74 6.14 1.09 0.83 6.16 1.18 
PBC3 0.95 5.64 1.40 0.93 6.21 1.02 0.91 6.21 1.08 
Self-efficacy 
(SEFF) 
SE1 0.91 5.76 1.32 0.96 6.24 0.98 0.92 6.25 0.99 
SE2 0.95 5.68 1.36 0.90 6.20 1.04 0.98 6.22 1.06 
SE3 0.96 5.78 1.33 0.93 6.25 0.95 0.96 6.22 1.11 
Response efficacy 
(REFF) 
RE1 0.88 5.42 1.06 0.70 5.45 1.27 0.88 5.65 1.25 
RE2 0.94 5.33 1.07 0.92 5.49 1.18 0.96 5.60 1.21 




PVUL1 0.87 3.83 1.61 0.85 4.02 1.45 0.93 3.49 1.52 
PVUL2 0.96 3.96 1.65 0.91 4.11 1.44 0.94 3.71 1.57 
PVUL3 0.94 3.91 1.62 0.69 3.96 1.47 0.88 3.64 1.56 
Perceived threat 
severity (TSEV) 
TSEV1 0.92 4.00 1.73 0.90 4.02 1.47 0.89 4.48 1.57 
TSEV2 0.97 3.83 1.81 0.96 3.96 1.54 0.95 4.38 1.57 
TSEV3 0.85 4.01 1.72 0.93 3.87 1.47 0.97 4.41 1.53 
Perceived sanction 
severity (SSEV) 
SSEV1 0.84 3.36 1.60 0.89 3.85 1.53 0.88 3.56 1.60 
SSEV2 0.92 3.38 1.87 0.93 4.00 1.78 0.96 3.78 1.78 




SP1 0.86 4.70 1.58 0.87 4.16 1.54 0.94 4.51 1.56 
SP2 0.86 4.48 1.60 0.91 4.11 1.52 0.92 4.46 1.63 
Perceived cost of 
compliance 
(PCOMP) 
PC1 0.83 4.75 1.67 0.88 4.09 1.61 0.88 4.43 1.60 
PC2 0.92 3.25 1.52 0.92 3.63 1.80 0.90 2.76 1.62 




PB1 0.75 2.61 1.43 0.86 3.92 1.81 0.86 3.12 1.71 
PB2 0.74 5.26 1.22 0.66 5.16 1.39 0.65 5.16 1.50 
PB3 0.93 5.25 1.19 0.91 4.84 1.45 0.96 5.04 1.42 
Perceived cost of 
noncompliance 
(PNCOMP) 
PNC1 0.81 5.00 1.21 0.92 4.67 1.49 0.87 4.94 1.43 
PNC2 0.86 4.86 1.46 0.83 4.55 1.50 0.87 4.91 1.50 
PNC3 0.97 4.88 1.45 0.92 4.47 1.50 0.93 4.86 1.51 
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